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A View from Inside a Multistakeholder Process  
Anne-Marie Buzatu
The use of private security companies (PSCs) to provide security services has been on the 
rise since the end of the Cold War, with PSCs operating in a number of contexts, including 
armed conflict and areas where the rule of law has been compromised. The use of private 
actors to perform services that are traditionally associated with the state is not limited to 
PSCs, but is emblematic of a growing trend by governments to outsource functions with 
a view to improving efficiency and cutting budgets. Privatization of public functions can, 
however, present a number of challenges to existing national and international regulatory 
and oversight frameworks. In the private security sector these challenges were brought to 
international attention after high-profile incidents in which PSCs injured civilians revealed 
difficulties in effectively holding international PSCs accountable. This paper argues that 
crafting a multistakeholder regulatory approach in which key stakeholders work together to 
develop standards that are appropriately adapted for the private sector, as well as to create 
governance and oversight mechanisms to hold these private actors to effective account, helps 
to fill some of the governance gaps found in traditional regulatory approaches. It recounts 
the developments leading to the International Code of Conduct for Private Security Service 
Providers (ICOC) and its governance and oversight mechanism, the ICOC Association, 
offering an example of the development of an initiative which sets new international 
standards and elaborates a multistakeholder framework and approach to governance for the 
private security sector. A recent trend of state and non-state clients requiring compliance with 
the ICOC initiative in their contracts with PSCs offers a new take on binding international 
regulation of private actors.
Anne-Marie Buzatu is deputy head of the Public-Private Partnerships Division at the Geneva 
Centre for the Democratic Control of Armed Forces (DCAF). Working under a mandate of the 
Swiss government, she led DCAF’s work to support the elaboration of the International Code 
of Conduct for Private Security Service Providers from January 2009 to November 2010. She 
subsequently led the development of the ICOC Association, a multistakeholder governance 
and oversight mechanism for the ICOC, which began operations in September 2013. Current 
projects include working with the International Committee of the Red Cross to develop 
guidance related to security sector governance and reform for multinational companies, as 
well as supporting better governance approaches for internet/cyber security.
3 Towards an International Code of Conduct for Private Security Providers
Towards an International  
Code of Conduct for  
Private Security Providers:






6 Osborn Street, Unit 2N
London E1 6TD
www.ubiquitypress.com
Text © Anne-Marie Buzatu 2015
First published 2015 
Transferred to Ubiquity Press 2018
Cover image © Loan Ngyuen
Editors: Alan Bryden & Heiner Hänggi 
Editorial assistance: Kathrin Reed 
Copy editor: Cherry Ekins 




This work is licensed under the Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 International License (unless stated oth-
erwise within the content of the work). To view a copy of this license, visit http://creativecommons.org/
licenses/by/4.0/ or send a letter to Creative Commons, 444 Castro Street, Suite 900, Mountain View, Cali-
fornia, 94041, USA. This license allows for copying any part of the work for personal and commercial use, 
providing author attribution is clearly stated.
This book was originally published by the Geneva Centre for the Democratic Control of Armed Forces (DCAF), an 
international foundation whose mission is to assist the international community in pursuing good governance 
and reform of the security sector. The title transferred to Ubiquity Press when the series moved to an open access 
platform. The full text of this book was peer reviewed according to the original publisher’s policy at the time. The
   original ISBN for this title was 978-92-9222-377-9.
SSR Papers is a flagship DCAF publication series intended to contribute innovative thinking on important 
themes and approaches relating to security sector reform (SSR) in the broader context of security sector 
governance (SSG). Papers provide original and provocative analysis on topics that are directly linked to the 
challenges of a governance-driven security sector reform agenda. SSR Papers are intended for researchers, 
policy-makers and practitioners involved in this field.
The views expressed are those of the author(s) alone and do not in any way reflect the views of the institutions 
referred to or represented within this paper.
Suggested citation: 
Buzatu, A-M. 2018. Towards an International Code of Conduct for Private Security Providers: A View from 
Inside a Multistakeholder Process. London: Ubiquity Press. DOI: https://doi.org/10.5334/bbw. License: 
CC-BY 4.0
4 5 Towards an International Code of Conduct for Private Security ProvidersAnne-Marie Buzatu
Contents
Introduction  _______________________________________________________ 4
Regulating Private Security Companies  _________________________________ 7 
The challenges of the private security sector ______________________________ 8 
International law and private actors  ___________________________________  10 
National and international regulatory responses  _________________________  12
Developing an International Code of Conduct  __________________________  26 
A second Swiss initiative  ____________________________________________ 27 
Developing a new multistakeholder approach __________________________  29 
Drafting the International Code of Conduct  _____________________________  33 
Setting relevant standards: The ICOC’s key provisions  ____________________  37
Building an Effective Oversight Mechanism  ____________________________ 43  
Preparing the ground for an oversight mechanism _______________________ 44 
Developing the ICOC Association  _____________________________________ 48 
Setting up governance structures: Articles of Association  __________________ 52 
The ICOC as a point of reference for new regulatory initiatives  _____________  58
Good Practices and Lessons Learned  __________________________________ 62 
Conclusion  _______________________________________________________ 67
Annexes  __________________________________________________________ 72  
International Code of Conduct for Private Security Providers  ______________ 72 
International Code of Conduct Association – Articles of Association _________ 93 
Notes  ___________________________________________________________ 108
The Ge eva Centre for t e Democratic Control
of Armed Forces (DCAF) is an international
foundation established on the initiative of the
Swiss government. It is one of the world’s leading
institutions in promoting good governance, and
focuses on a specific public sector niche – the
security sector. DCAF’s mission is to assist partner
states and international actors supporting these
stat s in improving th  governance of their security
sectors through inclusive and participatory reforms
based on international norms and good practices
and in response to specific local contexts and
challenges.
SSR Papers is a flagship DCAF publication series
intended to contribute innovative thinking on
important themes and approaches relating to
security sector reform (SSR) in the roader
context of security sector governance. Intended
for researchers, policymakers and practitioners
involved in this field, the papers provide original
and provocative analysis on topics that are directly
linked to the challenges of a governance-driven
SSR ag nda.
This paper has been submitted to a double-blind
peer review process. The editors would like to
thank the anonymous reviewers for their valuable
contribution.
The views expressed are those of the author(s)
alone and do not in any way reflect the views of the
institutions referred to or represented within this
paper.
ISBN 978-92-9222-377-9
© 2015 Geneva Centre for the Democratic
Control of Armed Forces
EDITORS Heiner Hänggi and Albrecht Schnabel
EDITORIAL ASSISTANCE Kathrin Reed
COPY EDITOR Cherry Ekins
DESIGN AND LAYOUT Pitch Black Graphic Design,
Berli /The Hague
COVER IMAGE © Loan Ngyuen
6 7 Towards an International Code of Conduct for Private Security ProvidersAnne-Marie Buzatu
industry, with some of the loudest voices coming from the PSC industry itself. 
This gives rise to a second question, asking what form this “more stringent means 
of regulation” should and could take, and furthermore how can it be developed? 
In this shifting climate, a number of creative initiatives have emerged whose 
approaches can be found along the axes of national/international regulation and 
private/public/public-private stakeholder participation.
Arising out of the recognition of these and similar challenges posed by a 
number of industry sectors is the nascent field of business and human rights 
(see SSR Paper 132). The emergence of various other efforts using non-state or 
public-private mechanisms to regulate several different industry sectors better 
highlights that the challenges posed by the regulation of PSCs are not unique to 
the PSC industry, but rather are symptomatic of a more fundamental shift in the 
way business is carried out on a global scale. In this light, approaches to regulation 
which are jointly developed by both state and relevant non-state actors – processes 
which are sometimes referred to as multistakeholder initiatives3 (MSIs) – can be 
seen as pragmatic responses to governance gaps4 that are created by the manner 
in which international business is carried out today. Such initiatives aim to 
support effective governance by ensuring that commercial actors operate within a 
framework of rule of law and respect for human rights, with an overarching goal 
of preventing human rights abuses perpetrated against the civilian population. 
Effective multistakeholder regulation of the private security sector aims to 
achieve this ultimate goal by creating a framework of oversight which can provide 
assurance that PSCs are performing to international standards.
This paper argues that crafting a multistakeholder regulatory approach in 
which key stakeholders work together to develop standards that are appropriately 
adapted for the private sector, as well as to create governance and oversight 
mechanisms to hold PSCs to effective account, helps to fill some of the governance 
gaps found in traditional regulatory approaches. In presenting this argument, the 
paper describes the ways in which groups composed of diverse and sometimes 
inimical stakeholders can together craft better approaches and solutions than 
would result from the work of one stakeholder group alone. It also speaks to 
the limitations of these initiatives, and offers some examples for supplementing 
them that give a new take on the state’s role in governance. 
The paper has five main parts: a conceptual section presenting the 
context out of which the ICOC initiative emerged, two sections that present in 
chronological fashion the developments leading to the creation of the ICOC and 
ICOCA respectively, and two sections taking stock and looking ahead, reflecting 
This paper was written during the set-up and establishment phase of the 
International Code of Conduct Association (ICOCA), the oversight and governance 
mechanism for the International Code of Conduct for Private Security Service 
Providers (ICOC). This institution, which was more than five years in the making, 
begins a new chapter in the regulation of private security companies1 (PSCs). 
If the ICOCA is able to meet even some of its ambitious objectives, it has the 
potential to transform how the international community regulates commercial 
security actors and their activities.
However, the very existence of this institution raises an important question, 
namely why has the private security industry voluntarily submitted itself to 
regulation, and even invited other stakeholders to join it in this endeavour? In 
considering this question, one first needs to understand why there is a need for 
more effective regulation, or in other words why the existing regulatory approaches 
are lacking or not sufficiently robust to regulate PSCs effectively. Answering this 
reveals that underlying assumptions in traditional state regulatory approaches 
are increasingly questionable, particularly in the face of the growing numbers of 
private actors taking up activities with proximate impacts on human rights on an 
international scale. This has created an environment in which the accountability 
of the private security industry has come into question, with concomitant damage 
to the sector’s reputation and calls for more stringent means of regulation of the 
Introduction
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The nature of the private security sector is characterized by two elements: 
the provision of security services, and their delivery by non-state actors. The 
convergence of these elements calls for new thinking about how and what kind 
of regulation can contribute to good governance of PSC security provision. A 
traditional approach to good governance of the security sector includes democratic 
oversight and control to help ensure that state security providers operate both 
effectively and accountably within a framework of rule of law and respect for 
human rights. PSCs have clear market-based incentives to be effective and efficient 
in their delivery of security to clients, but these incentives do not necessarily apply 
when it comes to respect for human rights within the population at large, account-
ability and transparency. Moreover, because PSCs have a different relationship to 
the state and democratic systems of governance, they are not typically covered by 
the same systems that ensure accountability and support transparency in state 
security provision. This creates a governance gap that non-traditional regulatory 
approaches can help to fill by ensuring that even though PSC staff are not under 
the same kinds of control mechanisms as are state security personnel, they still 
operate with transparency and accountability within a framework of rule of law 
and respect for human rights.
on lessons learned from these multistakeholder processes and considering 
what further work is required to support the effectiveness of this approach in 
accomplishing its ambitious goals going forward.
In preparing this paper, the author draws on her own direct experience and 
resources obtained through participation as a neutral facilitator to develop the 
ICOC and ICOCA, including in the research and preparation for and conceptu-
alization of the project, as well as in the meetings and drafting processes leading 
to the final agreed drafts of the ICOC and ICOCA. This is complemented by 
a review of the relevant literature as well as supplementary consultations with 
stakeholders involved in these initiatives. In the recognition that writing from 
such a position can compromise the impartiality of the approach, the paper has 
been carefully reviewed both internally and externally to address as far as possible 
these deficiencies. That said, where the paper falls short in this regard the author 
claims full responsibility and hopes that the benefits of providing an “insider” 
viewpoint account of these processes outweighs the negatives arising from a lack 
of an impartial perspective.
Regulating Private Security 
Companies
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armed forces or the police – but not necessarily for the same state in which they 
provide commercial security services. Some personnel have served in forces with 
controversial reputations, such as in South Africa during apartheid,8 or have 
gained their experience as non-state actors supporting governmental coups9 or 
operating in informal military groups or militias.10 It is common for personnel 
working for one company – or even working in one security team – to hail from 
different countries. Additionally, a company offering commercial security services 
may operate in multiple sites located in different countries.  
Market conditions, including a country’s regulation, can affect where a 
company chooses to locate its headquarters. A state with very lax oversight and 
few regulatory requirements may attract PSCs to set up shop on its territory. 
Moving a security team or even a company’s headquarters from one state 
to another also changes the governing legal regime regarding both national 
and international laws, including whether international human rights and 
international humanitarian law (IHL) apply and how they are enforced. All these 
factors – nationality of personnel, location of operations, home state of contractor 
and state of incorporation – can affect where, when and how various regulations 
apply to companies and their personnel. 
This brings us to the essential point that at the international level 
commercial security provision has become increasingly delinked from the state 
and its traditional sphere of control. Such a change means that the traditional 
paradigms for security provision, and more importantly the traditional paradigm 
for its regulation, no longer suffice to provide assurance that commercial security 
provision meets minimum standards of effectiveness and accountability. 
The impact of this shift has been hotly debated in recent times. The 
unprecedented appearance of large numbers of private security personnel 
during the Afghanistan and Iraqi wars in the early 2000s led to claims that PSCs 
operated with impunity11 in a “legal vacuum”.12 Investigative reports citing a long 
string of violent incidents for which allegedly responsible PSCs were not held 
accountable13 fuelled public outrage about private security personnel who seemed 
able and even predisposed14 to violate human rights of the civilian population 
while evading the usual constraints and oversight that applied to state security 
forces. PSCs responded to criticisms by emphasizing the “ethical” nature of their 
services and adopting self-imposed standards and codes of conduct – evidence 
that they saw the lack of effective regulation and oversight as bad for the industry.
At the same time, another current of thought took a more pragmatic approach 
to PSCs, seeing a legitimate place for such actors in an increasingly politically 
The challenges of the private security sector
Since the end of the Cold War the PSC industry has grown exponentially. 
Flourishing in a climate where state armies have been downsized, it provides 
a range of services supporting security provision – for both public and private 
clients – all over the world. Such services may include close personal protection, 
guarding of convoys and buildings, maintenance of weapons systems and 
advice to or training of state security personnel. As such, the services of private 
security providers can be said to impact the “public good”5 of security, including 
the human rights of the local population or “human security”.6 This holds true 
regardless of whether PSCs are contracted to protect something or someone in 
particular, or to contribute more generally to increased public security, such as 
by supplementing the work of public security forces. This raises the spectre of 
asymmetrical obligations, in that the PSC may only have an explicit contractual 
obligation to protect a distinct and therefore limited portion of the security sector, 
such as a particular person or property, as opposed to protecting general public 
security. Furthermore, this limited portion that the PSC is contracted to protect 
may be interpreted as taking precedence over other parts of the security sector, 
such as the public at large. This state of affairs differs significantly from the 
traditional concept of the state monopoly on the use of force, whereby security 
services are provided by public actors for the public good of security, and raises 
the question of whether there is a need for additional regulation. 
Given that the growth of commercial security providers is a direct result of 
both increased supply and increased demand, one could propose that market 
forces act as the primary regulatory mechanism, based on the logic that “bad” 
companies will eventually go out of business as their poor performance causes 
them to lose contracts. However, this reasoning relies on certain assumptions 
that may not always be valid, such as that information about prior poor behaviour 
will be available to future prospective clients, and further that clients agree about 
what constitutes “good” and “bad” behaviour. Given these considerable risks, 
one may ask why such companies are not prohibited altogether, so that security 
services are only provided by the state. The simple answer to an ostensibly simple 
question is that for a variety of reasons states are unwilling or unable to provide 
adequate public security, and also unwilling or unable to prohibit commercial 
actors from providing security on a private basis.7 Some of the more complex 
aspects to this question are teased out in the discussion below. 
The answer to the question of who works for PSCs touches on some of 
these aspects. Typically, PSC personnel have prior experience in either state 
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take forceful action, including in the form of launching an armed conflict 
against a non-compliant state. The notions of “collective security” and “collective 
self-defence” have made appearances in numerous international agreements 
on security and international order,21 and have been most recently enshrined in 
Chapter 7 of the UN Charter. While this restrictive approach has helped to reduce 
the number of international armed conflicts, in large measure this state-centric 
approach overlooks the plight of the vast majority of the ultimately intended 
beneficiaries of these international agreements: the civilian population, whose 
human rights states carry international obligations to protect.22
Viewed from this vantage point, certain weaknesses in the traditional 
state-centric approach to international regulation come to light, exposing 
underlying assumptions that are not always valid. The first of these assumptions 
is that a state has effective control over its territory. While there is no exact definition 
of what constitutes “effective control”, various authorities have evoked elements 
describing it as “exercising the functions of government”23 over a territory and 
population.24 In the case of private security, even if there was agreement on 
minimal prescriptions of effective control, there would be no guarantee that 
a state would have the willingness or capacity to govern PSC activities to the 
extent necessary to meet the requirements of providing accountability within a 
framework of rule of law and respect for human rights. A second assumption is 
that a state’s resident population remains reasonably static – and conducts the 
vast majority of its activities – within a territory where it is subject to the state’s 
regulatory regime. While it was known there would be visitors from one country 
to the next, as well as commercial transactions conducted between residents of 
different states, these transnational activities were understood to account for 
a small percentage of activities regulated by the state, and in any case the vast 
majority of these transnational transactions were assumed to have very little or no 
relationship to or impact on the core state functions that would be the subjects of 
international agreements among states. 
In a considerable and growing number of states one or both of these 
assumptions no longer holds true, leaving de facto gaps in regulatory 
effectiveness. Commentators have argued that the gradual shift from the pre-1945 
“law of coexistence” era characterized by the Westphalian order to the “law of 
cooperation” that began to take shape after the Second World War25 was a result 
of the international community realizing that there were areas important for 
their domestic interests which they could regulate more effectively together. 
This recognition of common interests26 led to an increase in the development of 
complex world. PSCs would be well suited to perform the “messy” humanitarian 
interventionist tasks that Western military forces did not want to take on, so long 
as services were provided within an international system of regulation taking into 
account international norms and values, including transparency and respect for 
human rights.15 The call for the development of different regulatory frameworks 
which adopted human-rights-based standards and some kind of public-private 
international oversight body for PSCs was raised by a number of authors.16 
Proposals were made that regulatory frameworks could be organized within the 
institutional auspices of the United Nations,17 or within an unconventional multi-
stakeholder framework inspired by the emerging area of business and human 
rights.18 
All concerned stakeholders, including the PSCs themselves, agreed that 
existing regulatory approaches were not sufficiently robust to provide good 
governance of PSCs. Governments found they were often unable to regulate PSCs 
effectively and hold them accountable (see the section below on Blackwater). Civil 
society organizations (CSOs) protested incidents where PSC activities violated 
human rights, with seemingly little available in effective control or sanctions.19 
PSCs, most of which provided security services without incident, found 
themselves to be subjects of intense criticism, portrayed as violent and dangerous 
actors operating with impunity. To understand better the context out of which this 
difficult situation arose, it is helpful to take a closer look at the existing approaches 
to regulation and the challenges PSCs posed to them.
International law and private actors
Since the mid-seventeenth century the traditional approach to international 
order has been based on the view that only sovereign states enjoy international 
legal personality, meaning that only states have rights and obligations under 
international law.20 The traditional approach relies upon states to set international 
standards and reach agreements for international law, as well as to enforce those 
standards and agreements upon the territories they control. If other governments 
become aware that a state is not enforcing its international obligations upon its 
territory, a variety of international responses have been developed, from stern 
diplomatic démarches to economic sanctions or launching an armed conflict 
against the offending state. 
However, particularly in this last case, international law has evolved to include 
the doctrine that only in cases where a state’s failure to meet its international 
obligations constitutes a threat to other states should the international community 
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Table 1: Regulatory initiatives across the public-private axis 
Initiatives regulating 
private military and security 
companies (PMSCs)
National International
Private British Association 




Fair Labor Association 
Public US law, South African law UN Draft Convention on 
PMSCs 
Public-private Swiss Federal Act, Security 
in Complex Environments 
Group30
UN Global Compact, 
UN Guiding Principles, 
Montreux Document, 
ICOC, Voluntary Principles
When it comes to the efficacy of regulation on the national level, many of the same 
challenges and weaknesses described above in relation to international regulation 
also apply. A state needs to have control over its territory and residents in order to 
enforce its own laws and regulations effectively. Even when a state is able to achieve 
this within its own territory, it still does not address the challenge posed by its 
residents engaging in activities and having impacts beyond its territorial borders. 
In response, one growing trend is for a state to enact laws that apply beyond its 
borders or have extraterritorial reach. However, the effectiveness of these kinds of 
laws is mixed, as the examples given in the following subsections illustrate. Even 
the most developed states lack oversight regimes that are designed, or are able, to 
enforce domestic legislation effectively abroad. The limits of national regulation 
to govern actors effectively beyond a country’s borders have encouraged the 
participation of private actors in different governance frameworks.
Private regulations on the national level
Recognizing the need for more effective national regulation, industry organizations 
have taken it upon themselves to develop codes of conduct for their members. These 
codes endeavour both to set standards for the commercial provision of security 
and to provide some measure of assurance that their members are operating 
in compliance with the codes. Both the American industry group International 
Peace Operations Association and the now-defunct British Association of Private 
international agreements and multilateral organizations with mandates covering 
specific subjects such as labour rights, intellectual property, food security and 
distribution, and public health – areas that were “historically the province of 
national governments only in their domestic relations” between “state and 
citizen… not between state and state”.27
These common interests have only increased as the world has become 
proverbially smaller, and more activities and transactions impacting on a domestic 
level are carried out on a transnational level by private actors. Additionally, the 
number of sovereign states has nearly tripled since the Second World War, and 
a growing number of states are deemed to be weak or failing,28 no longer in 
effective control of part or all of their territories. With travel and communication 
across borders becoming more accessible, increasing numbers of activities are 
conducted by private actors outside their official country of residence – sometimes 
without the person even being physically present on the territory within which 
the activity takes place.29 This evolving situation gives rise to a world in which 
international “common interests” concern matters not only between state and 
state and citizen and state, but also between citizen and citizen, where citizen 
activities may even take on governance aspects. This is especially true in the 
private security arena, where private actors directly impact the public goods of 
national and human security.
National and international regulatory responses
In recognition of these challenges to private security governance, states, industry 
and other actors have developed various responses in order to mitigate governance 
gaps. These initiatives can be grouped along the axis of public, public-private and 
private initiatives at the national and international levels. Table 1 sets out some 
examples of these various initiatives, which will be discussed in the following 
sections.
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investigation by the US State Department’s Diplomatic Security Services, which 
defendants argue tainted evidence such that it was not suitable to be admitted 
in a criminal trial – and this points to the kinds of challenges faced by states 
in conducting investigations outside their own territories.38 The long series of 
dismissals and procedural delays only served to reinforce claims of there being a 
“legal vacuum” regarding these actors. Simply put, the normal criminal oversight 
and investigation procedures of states are not designed nor typically sufficiently 
resourced to be carried out on foreign territory, and domestic criminal courts face 
significant challenges in prosecuting crimes committed abroad. 
Public-private regulations on the national level
In an effort to establish a more effective industry organization, in January 2011 
the UK government engaged in a novel public-private partnership with another 
industry body, the Security in Complex Environments Group (SCEG), which is 
housed within the Aerospace, Defence, Security and Space Industries (ADS) 
organization. This organization is governed by seven industry representatives 
elected by SCEG members, supported by affiliate members from ADS and the UK 
government’s Foreign and Commonwealth Office and Department of Transport.
Switzerland passed a law at the end of 2013 which exercises extraterritorial 
regulatory reach and also relies in part on the oversight functions of the ICOCA. 
Addressing PSCs either domiciled in or operating from Swiss territory, the 
Federal Act on Private Security Services Provided Abroad39 regulates companies 
providing private security and related services outside Switzerland and European 
Union/European Free Trade Area states. In addition to imposing a number of 
requirements related to training, identification of personnel and declaration 
by the PSC of the services it is providing, it requires the companies providing 
security services to join the ICOCA, the oversight mechanism for the ICOC.40
Private regulations on the international level
While within the increasingly internationalized security marketplace a “binding 
international agreement” would seem to be a logical and effective approach 
to regulating PMSCs, it would only be one piece of the puzzle in an effective 
response. This is because, as described above, only states can undertake these 
obligations, meaning that they individually agree to act in accordance with the 
international instrument.41 In the absence of a supranational body with policing 
or enforcement functions, states cannot be compelled to join an international 
agreement in the first place, and, as discussed earlier, in cases of non-compli-
Security Companies have developed such codes, which contain human-rights-
based standards for their members to follow. The fundamental weakness of these 
codes, however, lies in their lack of effective enforcement power. 
Public regulations on the national level
South Africa has enacted some of the most stringent extraterritorial legislation to 
date, aiming to regulate private security and military activities beyond its borders. 
These include the Regulation of Foreign Military Assistance Act 15 of 1998 
(FMA), and its intended replacement, the Prohibition of Mercenary Activities and 
Regulation of Certain Activities in Country of Armed Conflict Act 27 of 2006.31 
These laws endeavour to prohibit mercenary activities and regulate all forms of 
military assistance carried out in areas of armed conflict by persons with ties to 
South Africa, including citizens, permanent residents, companies incorporated 
in South Africa and persons who recruit persons for such activities within South 
Africa’s territorial borders. While the exact numbers are unknown, reports range 
from thousands32 to hundreds of thousands33 of such persons engaging in these 
activities outside South Africa’s borders. Taking an approach similar to arms export 
regimes, these laws require security service providers to obtain authorization 
from the South African National Conventional Arms Control Committee before 
providing military and security services outside South Africa. 
While wide-reaching in scope and purpose, the FMA has had difficulty in 
reaching the apparently large numbers of concerned persons who are violating 
the law. Convictions under the FMA have been few (less than ten), all taking the 
form of plea-bargains in which the defendants paid fines and served no jail term. 
In fact, in the few cases that went to trial, all defendants were acquitted.34 Experts 
speculate that the lack of convictions is due in part to the possibly unconstitu-
tional nature of the legislation,35 as well as to the practical difficulties of enforcing 
legislation extraterritorially.36 In essence, this would require that other countries 
and the companies operating within them were aware of South Africa’s legal 
requirements, and then enforced or followed them.37 
Another example of difficulties in effectively prosecuting PSCs operating 
abroad can be found in the September 2007 Nisour Square incident in Baghdad, 
Iraq. Nearly seven years after the incident, in which personnel of the PSC then 
known as Blackwater killed 14 civilians and wounded 20 more, a trial relating to 
the event was finally concluded, resulting in convictions of manslaughter against 
four personnel. However, the trial was initially dismissed, appealed and eventually 
petitioned to the US Supreme Court because of the alleged mishandling of the 
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the powers of arrest or detention, including the interrogation of detainees”.49 
It also provides some guidance on the use of force and firearms by PMSC 
personnel.50 Interestingly, aside from the crime of operating without a licence, 
the draft UNWG Convention does not create any new criminal offences for either 
PMSCs or their personnel.51 It does reiterate that states should penalize crimes 
under certain existing conventions, but presumably these would already be 
crimes in national law under the terms of those conventions ratified by states. As 
such, the text of the UNWG Convention does little to articulate new international 
standards or create new state obligations regarding PMSCs.52
Regarding oversight and accountability of PMSCs, the draft convention 
envisages two principal methods of enforcement. First, states would undertake 
to implement measures at the national level that would give flesh to their 
obligations under the convention. In this respect, PMSCs would be subject to 
the implementing legislation of the signatory state and not directly under the 
convention principles themselves.53 Second, it foresees the establishment of an 
international committee that would oversee the implementation by states of the 
convention, and could also potentially act as a forum for bringing complaints to 
the attention of states. 
In terms of state responsibility, it contains an explicit attribution of respon-
sibility by stating that “each state party bears responsibility for the military 
and security activities of PMSCs registered or operating in their jurisdiction, 
whether or not these entities are contracted by the State”.54 This statement clearly 
affirms responsibility for states providing security services within their territory. 
Including PMSCs “registered in their jurisdiction” could also refer to those 
companies operating outside their jurisdiction, therefore potentially requiring 
the development of extraterritorial legislation and an enforcement framework. 
By engaging international law and state responsibility, the draft convention 
does have potential international legal power. It reaffirms the traditional 
international principle of state sovereignty,55 and its approach relies on state 
structures of investigation, adjudication and enforcement. Furthermore, one of 
the greatest strengths of the draft convention can be found in its provisions to 
coordinate the investigation, extradition and prosecution of PMSCs and their 
personnel56 in a manner that could be called a framework for future mutual 
legal assistance treaties. It also creates an international committee which looks 
very similar to other treaty-based international committees,57 and proposes a 
model for licensing import and export of PMSC services, evoking small-arms 
trade agreements. Under this logic, in a similar manner to the South African 
ance the available sanctions are limited and generally have a disproportion-
ately negative impact on the civilian population. Several different additional 
approaches on the international level have evolved to influence the behaviour of 
state and non-state actors. These efforts, which have largely taken place outside 
the traditional processes for developing and negotiating a treaty, point to “soft” 
international regulation which eschews “binding” international legal standards 
in favour of normative efforts that aim to change the way both public and private 
actors behave. As such, they have contributed to the development of public-pri-
vate and multistakeholder regulatory approaches, including the ICOC initiative.
Private regulations on the international level 
One such initiative is the Fair Labor Association (FLA), which was very influential 
in the development of the ICOC. An MSI that began in 1999, the FLA aims to 
improve labour practices internationally by monitoring company compliance 
with international labour standards. Importantly, this MSI conducts independent 
audits of factories worldwide, providing public reports of their findings that are 
available on the initiative’s website. However, the FLA has received criticism for 
not including labour unions as part of its membership,42 as well as for being too 
sympathetic to the industry,43 which pays for the vast majority of the initiative’s 
running costs.44 Furthermore, while this MSI includes companies, colleges 
and universities and CSOs in its members, it does not have representatives of 
government as part of its membership. 
Public regulations on the international level
Taking a more traditional state regulatory approach, the UN Working Group on 
the Use of Mercenaries (UNWG) produced the draft International Convention 
on the Regulation, Oversight and Monitoring of Private Military and Security 
Companies (UNWG Convention).45 First released in late 2008, the draft UNWG 
Convention is intended to be binding on its state signatories and also seeks to 
establish new rules and procedures vis-à-vis PMSC46 regulation. 
The draft UNWG Convention provides guidance to states in their regulation 
of PMSCs in several areas. For example, it asks them to enact special regulation, 
including registration and licensing of PMSCs and prohibitions on PMSCs 
using “weapons of mass destruction”47 or participating in the overthrow of 
governments.48 In terms of PMSCs, it lists some “inherently governmental” 
activities which they should not perform, including “waging war and/or combat 
operations, taking prisoners, espionage, intelligence and police powers, especially 
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PMSCs. Its efforts have included a project for developing a database of national 
regulation of PMSCs, and acknowledging the “complementary” nature of its 
objectives with those of the Montreux Document (see below) and the ICOC 
initiative.61 
Public-private regulations on the international level
In addition to more conventional approaches to international regulation, the UN 
has been involved in several public-private initiatives with a view to improving 
regulation of the international commercial sector. One of the first initiatives of this 
kind, the UN Global Compact (UNGC), has enjoyed resurgence of late. PSCs were 
not the only businesses to see their market grow exponentially after the end of the 
Cold War. In the 1990s multinational corporations shifted away from traditional 
“external” trade negotiated between states to a model where international 
business transactions were carried out within “internal” international corporate 
networks that largely left states out of the picture.62 Amid increasing reports 
about sweatshops, child labour63 and abuses by private security firms protecting 
company installations, there was increased concern about human rights being 
violated by these corporations. 
In response, the UNGC, an initiative to encourage businesses all over the 
world to adopt socially responsible, human-rights-compliant and environmentally 
friendly practices and to provide reports on their implementation, was officially 
launched in June 2000. It consists of ten principles in the areas of human rights, 
labour standards, the environment and anti-corruption efforts.64 The UNGC 
is not a regulatory instrument, and companies that declare their support and 
intention to comply with its principles are not subject to any oversight; rather its 
primary function is to serve as a forum for discussion on the issues surrounding 
business and its impacts on human rights. 
Member companies are expected to implement the principles in their 
business strategies, and integrate these into their day-to-day operations and 
organizational culture. Companies are not the only participants in the UNGC, 
which also includes other UN agencies, CSOs, academics, business associations, 
labour organizations and cities, which pledge to translate the UNGC principles 
into day-to-day urban governance and management. Recently the UNGC has 
tried to increase non-business participation, launching in October 2013 a 
“communication on engagement” tool suggesting ways in which non-business 
participants can support UNGC implementation.
legislation described above, private security services are likened to arms and 
traded in a similar manner. This framework could offer more structured control 
to “importing” states, providing a more standardized basis – or not – for PMSCs 
to operate on their territory.
Unfortunately, the draft convention does not solve many of the biggest 
challenges posed to state regulation by PMSC activities. As discussed above, many 
states that have PMSCs operating on their territory do not have effective control, 
and relying on territorial state enforcement in these circumstances is unrealistic. 
Furthermore, it fails in large measure to set and harmonize international 
standards, instead relying on individual states to carry out enforcement on a 
state-by-state basis. As standards and enforcement can vary significantly among 
states, so could standards and enforcement under this convention. Finally, while 
it establishes a complaints process58 for the international committee to hear 
allegations of violations, only state parties to the convention have the standing 
to file a complaint that another state party is not upholding its state obligations 
to regulate PSCs effectively. In practical terms, this means that members of civil 
society who have been negatively impacted by PMSCs would have to rely on 
another state outside the one in which they are located to bring the matter to the 
attention of the committee. 
Perhaps the draft convention’s greatest weakness, however, is one of politics 
rather than of substance. Elaborated under a “mercenary” mandate, the UNWG 
is not supported by many states that have closer links to private security services, 
or within the PMSC industry itself. Voting patterns in the UN Human Rights 
Council and General Assembly show support for the UNWG and the UNWG 
Convention coming from the G77 group of states, with consistent opposing votes 
from the Western European & Others group.59 Under these circumstances the 
draft convention faces the near-impossible task of generating support within the 
industry and states from and within which it operates – and their ratification 
would be essential for the draft convention to have a chance to be effective. 
The lack of political support may provide an explanation for the lack of further 
development of this draft since its release at the end of 2008.60 It has arguably 
had more of a normative influence as a “soft law” instrument reinforcing the 
traditional state-centric regulatory approach to PMSCs, finding support among 
many civil society groups and some states. Furthermore, in the years since its 
release the UNWG has taken a more pragmatic turn, showing itself to be more 
open to a variety of regulatory efforts and good practices for the regulation of 
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by companies operating in conflict-affected areas, identifying several risk-miti-
gating strategies that states can undertake. 
The second pillar articulates a corporate responsibility to respect human 
rights, explaining that companies “should avoid infringing on the human rights 
of others” and should address negative human rights impacts in which they are 
involved.72 The Guiding Principles go on to refer to the rights expressed in the 
International Bill of Human Rights and the International Labour Organization’s 
Declaration on Fundamental Principles as articulating the minimum set of human 
rights that companies should respect.73 Companies are advised that, in order to 
fulfil their responsibility to protect, they should have in place appropriate policies 
and processes to exercise due diligence74 in preventing and remediating adverse 
human rights impacts. The document then explains what some of these policies 
and processes should look like, including those for carrying out human rights 
impact assessments,75 promoting transparency76 and providing remediation.77
The third pillar sets out a framework for access to remedy by those who have 
been adversely affected by human rights abuses. It sets out operational principles 
for state-based judicial and non-judicial mechanisms, as well as non-state-based 
grievance mechanisms, including those found in human-rights-based “industry, 
multi-stakeholder and other collaborative initiatives”. Principle 31 offers guidance 
on how grievance mechanisms should look and the process for developing 
non-judicial grievance mechanisms.
The Guiding Principles have been generally, though not unanimously, well 
received by both public and private sectors, with the UN creating a working group 
on business and human rights in 2012 to take over Special Representative Ruggie’s 
mandate. They have been referenced in numerous documents, tools and other 
guidance developed by companies, academics, governments and international 
organizations.78 However, as a soft law instrument they have also been criticized 
for not being sufficiently robust, with many CSOs and governments calling for 
more stringent “binding law” in the form of an international agreement. To this 
end, in June 2014 the twenty-fourth session of the Human Rights Council adopted 
by contentious vote a resolution to create an open-ended working group to draft a 
binding instrument on human rights and transnational corporations.79 
International public-private initiatives to improve respect for human rights 
by the private sector have also taken place outside the UN. With states, companies 
and NGOs constituting the three pillars of membership, the Voluntary Principles 
on Security and Human Rights (VPs) were launched in 2000 to develop human 
rights guidelines for extractive companies’ engagement with both public and 
While the UNGC boasts more than 12,000 participants, it has received a fair 
amount of criticism, in particular for the initiative’s lack of oversight and account-
ability mechanisms. Critics point out that a company’s status as a participant 
gives no assurance that it actually operates in compliance with the principles, 
providing it with a positive public relations vehicle that is not necessarily merited 
(also known as “bluewashing”65). Complaints raised by CSOs alleging violations 
of the UNGC by participating companies have resulted in no action on the part of 
the UNGC.66 Additionally, critics have claimed that companies use the UNGC as 
an entry point to influence UN policies, as well as an excuse to discourage states 
from pursuing binding international regulation.67 
In another initiative to promote corporate respect for human rights, the 
UN Commission on Human Rights (now known as the Human Rights Council) 
created a mandate in 2005 for an expert, Special Representative John Ruggie, to 
consider the issue of business and human rights. In consultations with companies, 
state representatives, non-governmental organizations (NGOs), human rights 
academics and other experts, he developed a three-pillar framework identifying 
the state duty to protect human rights, the corporate duty to respect human 
rights and the right of individuals to have access to an effective remedy, otherwise 
known as the “protect, respect and remedy” framework. This formed the basis for 
the much more elaborated Guiding Principles on Business and Human Rights: 
Implementing the United Nations “Protect, Respect and Remedy” Framework 
(Guiding Principles), which were endorsed unanimously by the Human Rights 
Council in 2011.68 
The first pillar of the Guiding Principles recalls the state’s duty to protect 
against human rights abuses by third parties, including businesses. In upholding 
this duty, the state must take “appropriate steps to prevent, investigate, punish 
and redress such abuse through effective policies, legislation, regulations and 
adjudication”.69 The commentary to the Guiding Principles explains that this 
duty to protect is a “standard of conduct”, and as such a state is not necessarily 
responsible for the abuses conducted by private actors, but could be if it has failed 
to take appropriate steps to “prevent, investigate, punish and redress” these abuses. 
States should also “promote respect for human rights by business enterprises 
with which they conduct commercial transactions”,70 with the commentary 
explaining that states have an opportunity through their procurement practices to 
promote respect for human rights by businesses, “including through the terms of 
contracts”.71 It also highlights the increased risk of “gross human rights abuses” 
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of organizing state obligations according to the state’s relationship to a PMSC, 
categorizing states as:
1. “Contracting States” – states that directly contract for the services of PMSCs, 
including, as appropriate, where such a PMSC contracts with another PMSC;
2. “Territorial States” – states on whose territory PMSCs operate;
3. “Home States” – states of nationality of a PMSC, i.e. where a PMSC is registered 
or incorporated, or where it has its principal place of management.87
These categorizations are particularly notable for recognizing cross-border or 
transnational state obligations under international law, which are defined by the 
particular relationship of a private company to a state.88 The recognition of these 
relationships and subsequent responsibilities has helped to bring new clarity to 
the discussions of regulatory options, giving granularity to general principles that 
had been too ambiguous to implement effectively.
Turning to the issue of state responsibility for actions committed by PMSCs 
and their personnel, while the Montreux Document recognizes that merely 
entering into a contract does not in itself engage the responsibility of states, it 
reaffirms customary international law on attribution of responsibility to a state in 
specific cases for acts committed by non-state actors.89 It also sets out a standard 
for “superior responsibility” for the actions of PMSC personnel that arguably 
went beyond customary law, stating that superiors such as governmental officials 
or directors/managers of PMSCs “may be liable for crimes under international law 
committed by PMSC personnel under their effective authority and control”,90 
while nevertheless specifying that “superior responsibility is not engaged solely 
by virtue of a contract”.91 Of note is the inclusion of non-state commercial 
management in the category of those who may bear criminal responsibility for 
actions of their personnel. Taking a similar approach to the draft UNWG,92 the 
Montreux Document also sets out some limits as to what states could outsource 
to PMSCs, articulating a set of inherently governmental functions derived from 
IHL.93 
In addition to articulating state obligations, it identifies 73 good practices 
that states should adopt vis-à-vis PMSCs operating both in areas of armed conflict 
and outside armed conflict. Grounded firmly in international law, particularly 
international human rights law, these good practices have contributed significantly 
to the ongoing and emerging discussions about companies’ corporate responsi-
private security forces that protect their installations. The VPs provide a forum 
for exchange among the different stakeholders. Each year the stakeholders are 
expected to produce an annual report on their efforts to implement the VPs; 
although, with the exception of the civil society pillar, these reports are generally 
not made public. The initiative can also undertake “in-country VPs processes”, 
which endeavour to implement the VPs in countries where there are a significant 
number of extractive installations. Despite these efforts, the VPs initiative has been 
the subject of much criticism from the civil society pillar, in particular for its lack 
of independent assurance or oversight of VPs’ implementation.80 Consequently, 
most of the human rights advocacy CSOs have left the initiative, including 
Amnesty International and Oxfam,81 with CSOs which provide human rights 
consulting services to companies making up the bulk of the diminished CSO 
pillar. This has led to concerns that the CSO pillar is not sufficiently independent 
from the company pillar to represent fairly the interests of local communities.82
In focus: The Montreux Document
The Montreux Document on pertinent international legal obligations and good 
practices for states related to operations of PMSCs during armed conflict aimed 
to address the negative impacts of private security activities on IHL and human 
rights. Concerned by reports of wrongdoing by PMSCs, particularly within the 
context of armed conflicts, and further assertions that PMSCs operated in a “legal 
vacuum”,83 the Swiss government set out to demonstrate that in fact IHL did apply 
to PMSCs operating within an armed conflict, and further to set out pertinent state 
legal obligations required under existing IHL vis-à-vis these non-state actors. To 
achieve these objectives, the Swiss partnered with the International Committee of 
the Red Cross to launch a process that came to be known as the “Swiss Initiative”, 
bringing together states to develop and crystallize this understanding, and also 
inviting members of the PMSC industry, CSOs, academics and other relevant 
stakeholders84 to contribute their expertise to the process.85
Between January 2006 and September 2008 four meetings were organized 
to consider existing treaty obligations arising out of the Geneva Conventions as 
well as to consolidate good practices for governments in their interactions with 
PMSCs. The resulting Montreux Document offers a new take on international 
regulation, interpreting existing binding treaty law contained in the Geneva 
Conventions and their additional protocols/customary law86 through the lens of 
the modern phenomenon of non-state actors operating in areas and functions 
that traditionally had been the province of state actors. It takes the approach 
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PMSCs. However, there was also a sentiment from the industry that more was 
needed to make regulation effective. While welcoming the Montreux Document, 
industry representatives noted that since it relied largely on states to give it effect, 
the document did not really address the challenge of weakened rule of law where 
states were not upholding their obligations. At the close of the meeting industry 
participants called on Switzerland to help them develop regulation “with teeth” 
that applied directly to the PMSCs themselves. This call was answered by the 
Swiss government with the launch of the ICOC initiative.
bility to respect human rights in their activities, as well as providing a foundation 
for the subsequent ICOC.
The Montreux Document is notable for a number of reasons. Although the 
fruit of (mostly) state discussions and grounded in public international law, it was 
agreed and endorsed not through international treaty negotiations but through an 
innovative process of interpreting existing obligations in light of new challenges. 
Endorsing states publicly asserted that they understood their obligations as 
contained in previously agreed treaties to conform to the new interpretation 
contained in the Montreux Document, and, through an official communication 
to the Swiss government, they became “participating states”.94 This resulted in a 
curious juxtaposition of earlier state commitments made when such scenarios 
and actors were not yet on the radar being “recalled” in light of these newly 
identified challenges, and the creative use of terms such as “participating” (instead 
of “signatory” or “ratifying”) to indicate a state’s support for the document. It 
proceeded on the assumption “that certain well-established rules of international 
law apply to states in their relations with private military and security companies 
(PMSCs) and their operation during armed conflict”,95 and that these well-estab-
lished rules included IHL and human rights law. This formula, whereby existing 
rules and laws were restated to describe explicitly how they should be applied to 
PMSCs, would be used again in the development of the ICOC.
Furthermore, the manner in which the Montreux Document was finalized 
and in which states demonstrated agreement with the text distinguished it from 
traditional international agreements. States verbally stated their approval to the 
assembled group, and for states and international organizations endorsing later 
this meant them sending an official letter to the Swiss Federal Department of 
Foreign Affairs in which they communicated their support for the document.96 At 
the time of writing another 34 states have communicated their support, bringing 
the total to 52 participating states, along with three international organizations.97
Finally, from the outset of the initiative non-state actors and experts were 
involved in the conversations to inform these interpretations, and to help ensure 
that they were relevant and made sense in light of current industry practices. While 
these non-state actors were not the primary addressees of the Montreux Document 
and did not hold state obligations in regards to PMSCs, they nevertheless had an 
important part in influencing the document.
At the last meeting on 17 September 2008, along with the endorsing states, 
there was clear appreciation of the Montreux Document from participating 
non-state actors, including members of human rights CSOs, academics and 
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as well as to ensure that personnel operated in accordance with such standards. 
However, at the outset of this process in late 2008/early 2009, there was no 
“how-to” manual offering clear instructions for achieving these objectives. As a 
result, the project facilitators98 set in motion an iterative process that first aimed 
to acquire a thorough understanding of real on-the-ground challenges posed by 
PSC activities, and then began to develop tailored responses to those challenges. 
Building on the substantial foundation of the Montreux Document, the Guiding 
Principles and experiences of other business and human rights initiatives, the 
initiative learned as it went along, eventually taking on the character of an MSI. 
A second Swiss initiative
It helps to set the clock back to late 2008 to understand why a code of conduct path 
was chosen. At this time the Afghan and Iraqi wars had been going on for more 
than five years, with reports that the numbers of private contractors operating 
in these environments exceeded US personnel on the ground.99 In response, 
a number of different entities,100 including industry groups and even the US 
Congress, tried their hand at different approaches to regulation, with limited 
apparent success (see the subsection above on national regulations). Against this 
backdrop three elements converged: 
 • The problem of perceived impunity. The Nisour Square incident of 17 September 
2007 involving the PSC then known as Blackwater (see above) gained even 
more notoriety as it became increasingly clear that investigations of the event 
had been compromised, casting doubt on whether the contractors would be 
tried in a court of law.
 • The apparent failure of conventional international regulatory approaches. This was 
exemplified by the UN Convention on Mercenaries, and by development of 
the draft UNWG Convention (see above). This divisive convention was widely 
supported by the G77 group of states, but strongly opposed by developed 
countries, in particular the US and the UK.
 • The promise of new and innovative regulatory approaches. The recent success of 
the Montreux Document as an innovative approach to shaping international 
law without going through a traditional treaty-negotiating process, coupled 
with the emerging field of business and human rights as enshrined in the 
Guiding Principles and demonstrated in other MSIs such as the FLA and the 
VPs, offered the promise that something similar and perhaps even more robust 
could be developed for the private security industry.  
This section takes an in-depth look into the efforts of the Swiss government to 
develop international standards for the private security industry. It describes the 
processes undertaken to identify the most important challenges posed by this 
industry to human security, and then to provide tailor-made responses forming 
the foundation upon which the international standards were based. Some of the 
key provisions of the ICOC are then considered in more detail, explaining how 
they are meant to respond to the identified challenges. The section also describes 
how an initiative which began as being essentially industry-driven then took on 
the character of an MSI. 
In January 2009 the Swiss government initiated a complementary effort 
to improve accountability of the private security sector. From the outset, the 
initiative aimed to address the most pressing challenges to effective private 
security regulation: the absence of clear international standards for how PSCs 
should operate, and important de facto gaps in the accountability of PSCs to such 
standards. Nearly all existing national and international laws relied on states’ 
effective and jurisdictional control to implement them, which, as discussed above, 
could be lacking. There was also a strong desire expressed by the PSC industry 
to have one clear international standard describing what “good” private security 
provision looked like. By developing more universally accepted benchmarks for the 
provision of private security, this would help PSCs to streamline their operations 
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area of conflict between any given stakeholder groups, and furthermore there 
was a great deal of overlap in terms of both identified challenges and proposed 
responses. 
In addition to these workshops, bilateral consultations were held during 
this period with a number of non-state clients – both multinational corporations 
(primarily extractive industry companies) and humanitarian organizations using 
PSCs to improve the security of missions conducted in complex environments.
Developing a new multistakeholder approach
Most of the areas of discussion in early 2009 are still relevant more than half a 
decade on, with several now-familiar themes making the first of many appearances 
in the process. These ranged from the areas of operation in which the initiative 
should be applicable to the kinds of activities that should fall under its scope. 
Industry workshop (March 2009)
Before trying to define clear international standards for how PSCs should 
operate, it was important to understand more precisely the nature of their service 
offerings. Industry stakeholders participating in the workshop were keen to make 
a distinction between the services they provided and those offered by so-called 
“mercenaries” or state armed personnel. In particular, while they did sometimes 
provide services in the context of an armed conflict, participants stressed that 
their personnel did not directly participate in hostilities, and furthermore that 
they also provided services in areas that were not experiencing armed conflict. 
There was consensus that any standards should be applicable in any operational 
context. Consequently, participants felt that while the Montreux Document and 
IHL were important standards to build upon, a code of conduct should primarily 
be based upon international human rights standards.105 
Discussions led to an overall consensus that the appropriate scope for a code 
of conduct would cover those activities that have a high likelihood of affecting 
human rights (e.g. right to life). This and other similar discussions found 
expression in the eventual ICOC text, which covers both armed and non-armed 
security services, but also adds the notion of “armed services”, including “any 
other activity for which the Personnel or Companies are required to carry or 
operate a weapon in the performance of their duties”.106 
During the discussions industry participants additionally raised the 
common practice of contracting out security services to other service providers, 
and emphasized that all subcontractors should be held accountable to the same 
The Nisour Square incident served to ignite further earlier contentious 
discussions about the lack of clear standards for private security actors. At 
the same time, the US difficulties in swiftly and effectively investigating and 
prosecuting the personnel involved put a spotlight on the challenges faced by 
states to hold accountable PSCs operating in complex environments. However, 
instead of helping to build international consensus, the response of a portion of 
the international community, epitomized by the development of the draft UNWG 
Convention in 2008, only served to increase the north-south divide, with the 
two sides too far apart in their positions to begin any substantive dialogue on 
international standards or mechanisms to improve PSC accountability. In the face 
of such an impasse, the second Swiss initiative offered a potential way forward.
This is not to say that the Swiss efforts to improve regulation and account-
ability of the private security sector were universally appreciated. At the start of 
the ICOC initiative the UNWG, the force behind the draft UNWG Convention, 
was very sceptical of both the Montreux Document and the ICOC,101 criticizing 
the lack of involvement of Latin American and Caribbean states and the strong 
participation of “Western states” as showing “the heavy involvement of countries 
from where most of the security industry originates and operates”.102 While it 
was supportive of the Montreux Document, similar criticisms vis-à-vis the ICOC 
initiative have been echoed by South Africa.103 
While on its face it seemed obvious that any international standard should 
have as its “purpose… to oblige such companies to comply with international 
human rights standards and the norms of international humanitarian law 
(IHL), thus improving the protection of human rights”,104 less clear was how to 
develop the initiative to achieve this purpose. To kick off the consultations, three 
workshops were organized during the first part of 2009 to speak directly with the 
most implicated stakeholders: the industry (March 2009), civil society/academic 
subject-matter experts (April 2009) and states/international organizations (May 
2009). These early discussions set the tone for the initiative and helped to lay the 
groundwork for the eventual ICOC text.
These initial workshops were organized in stakeholder groups, reflecting an 
early belief that this approach would foster more frank and open discussions as 
participants would feel more comfortable voicing their honest concerns among 
presumably more like-minded participants. Early discussions were structured into 
two parts: identifying standards and good practices for PSCs and related services, 
and effective accountability mechanisms for PSCs and related services. While 
each stakeholder group voiced distinct areas of priority, there was no obvious 
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CSO workshop (April 2009)
Participating CSOs evoked here many of the same themes that were discussed in 
the industry workshop, with more of the discussion focused on possible models 
for oversight and accountability mechanisms as well as the need to ensure 
effective remedies for victims. In a similar fashion to their industry counterparts, 
CSO participants agreed that IHL and human rights standards should be the 
basis for a code of conduct for PSCs, but there was some concern that creation of 
such a code could create two tiers of PSCs – legitimate PSCs willing and able to 
comply with the code, and those PSCs that were not. Some expressed the concern 
that those actors falling outside the application of the code may actually be those 
in more need of accountability. This raised the larger issue of voluntariness of the 
code, and the worry that without state enforcement powers requiring compliance 
such a document would only serve to validate the practices of the “good” companies 
that were already operating largely in compliance with humanitarian and human 
rights standards, and not require improvement on the part of those companies 
which were not. 
A discussion followed on the recent efforts of national courts to apply 
laws primarily meant for state agents to civilian contractors, with participants 
acknowledging that these had not been wholly effective, and further that they 
had created confusion regarding how PSCs should be treated under existing law. 
This led to the recognition that uniform international PSC standards could make 
a critical positive contribution to effective industry regulation. Such standards, it 
was generally acknowledged, could not only have a preventive effect, lowering the 
number of human rights violations, but could also have the potential to provide 
more clarity to national courts on the appropriate standards for compliance 
with human rights by transnational PSCs. Furthermore, non-judicial grievance 
mechanisms could add value in their own right by supplementing available 
national judicial remedies and supporting victims’ access to effective remedies.
CSO workshop participants also expressed a clear preference for an 
international oversight body, which at a minimum should be mandated to receive 
complaints from people affected by the conduct of PSCs and oversee whether 
PSCs were respecting the ICOC. A central issue discussed here was how to make a 
code of conduct enforceable. All participants affirmed the primary role of the state 
in ensuring compliance with and punishing violations of law, while recognizing 
that implementation varied significantly from state to state and even from case to 
case. While some were of the opinion that an international code of conduct might 
require implementing national legislation to give it legal enforceability, others 
requirements and standards as the contractor. The notion of “due diligence”, 
including in the context of hiring subcontractors, would also feature prominently 
in the ICOC (see discussion below on subcontractors). 
Turning to the topic of identifying potential accountability, oversight and 
enforcement mechanisms, two distinctive approaches emerged as alternatives for 
ensuring the oversight and enforcement of an international PSC code of conduct: 
a model based on the enforcement of common standards on an ad hoc state-
by-state basis, and a model where standards would be enforced by a centralized 
international body, possibly an international secretariat, international industry 
association, international complaints commission or, as some suggested, an 
ombudsperson type of institution. Most participants argued that, if empowered 
with robust oversight and enforcement powers, an international body would be 
capable of addressing some of the governance gaps caused by incomplete national 
regulatory regimes and/or limited ability/willingness on the part of some states 
to regulate the PSC industry.
In terms of the actual functions of such an oversight body, some participants 
expressed scepticism as to the capacity of an international non-state body to 
investigate offences committed by a PSC on the ground. It was suggested that 
its primary functions should be to receive complaints alleging violations of the 
code, advise the competent state authorities on alleged violations for further 
investigation, and impose sanctions and/or suspend membership in the case 
of established misconduct. Participants reaffirmed the importance of the state’s 
role in applying and enforcing criminal sanctions, recognizing that the oversight 
mechanisms would not be a substitute for this power. Moreover, the role of the 
state as contractor and its capacity to incorporate the code of conduct standards in 
its procurement practices were singled out as important means of enforcement, 
giving leverage that could help ensure the compliance of PSCs with a minimum 
set of rules, yet high respect for human rights standards. Such an arrangement 
could lead to the exclusion of non-compliant PSCs from bidding procedures and 
provide a legal contractual remedy against PSCs in cases of breach of contract, 
which would include breach of the code. This notion of “co-regulation”, in which 
a state actor requires compliance with a non-state governance framework of 
international standards, was a common theme in the three preliminary workshops 
as well as throughout the process, and has become an important element of 
enforcement of the code.
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 • This was reflected in the “Nyon Declaration” (see below) agreed by representa-
tives of PMSCs and their associations at the closing session of the conference.
 • There was general acceptance that the private security industry must take 
the lead in this process;109 but the industry would not be able to act alone and 
would require strong and substantial support from other stakeholders, with 
civil society helping to ensure the process remained committed to the highest 
standards.
 • Substantial agreement was reached on the general structure of an international 
code of conduct, along with recognition that a recurring challenge would be 
how to broaden participation by PMSCs in an international code of conduct 
without weakening the standards it contained.110
The conference came to a close with private security industry groups issuing 
the Nyon Declaration, stating that an international code of conduct compliant 
with human rights and IHL and including effective oversight, accountability and 
operational standards should be developed.111
Another less tangible but hugely important result of the Nyon conference 
was the beginning of building trust between different stakeholders. Discussions 
were constructive, with all stakeholder groups participating actively and adding 
value. The large turnout of concerned actors underlined the commitment and 
importance the different groups accorded to this work. 
Leaving the conference with a clear mandate and a proposed structure to 
elaborate a code of conduct for PSCs, as well as the clear impression that the 
project was on the right path, the Swiss initiative began drafting the ICOC.
Drafting the International Code of Conduct 
Having found their initial multistakeholder strategy to have been largely 
successful, the project organizers continued along the same lines, including all 
previously involved stakeholders and enlarging discussions to include another 
important stakeholder in the supply chain: insurance companies. As a result, 
between September 2009 and September 2010 eight workshops were held, of 
which six were multistakeholder and the other two were attended primarily 
by industry representatives with some limited participation from the other 
stakeholder groups. 
During this time, two draft versions of the ICOC were released for public 
comment: a first draft in January 2010 and a second in August 2010. The final 
draft was essentially agreed at the last multistakeholder workshop in September 
felt that such a code could be applied principally through incorporation into PSC 
contracts, providing legal contractual remedies against a PSC in case of breach, 
which could include violations of human rights. This theme of mixing state and 
non-state regulatory mechanisms to improve accountability, or “co-regulation”, 
was continued in a discussion using the example of the UK Law Society and Bar 
Council, whereby some kind of validated adherence to industry standards would 
be required for engagement in the “profession”, with the state requiring that only 
members in good standing with the oversight body could offer PSC services for 
hire. 
States and intergovernmental organizations workshop (May 2009)
Participants at the last preparatory workshop represented both regulators and 
clients of PSCs, and discussions primarily reflected these two perspectives. Hence 
the main areas of discussion centred on the means of effectively overseeing PSCs 
and the particular challenges and needs of PSC clients. While it was generally 
agreed that national regulation should provide the primary means of holding 
PSCs accountable, as in the previous workshops it was recognized that national 
legislation alone was often not sufficient. Participants representing clients noted 
that they would find a reliable means of differentiating between PSCs useful, 
expressing hope that a suitable international code of conduct would become 
the benchmark against which all key buyers and suppliers of PSCs would be 
measured. To that end, the creation of a central public register or database of 
PSCs currently in compliance with an international code of conduct would be an 
indispensable resource for many entities contracting PSCs. 
Multistakeholder workshop (June 2009)
This first phase of the project culminated in bringing all involved stakeholders 
together for a conference organized by the UK-based organization Wilton Park,107 
held in Nyon, Switzerland, in June 2009. The conference was well attended, with 
nearly 50 representatives from PSCs, civil society, academia, non-state clients and 
states, including four of the P5 states.108 The key outcomes of the event included 
the following:
 • There was broad consensus to draft an international code of conduct based 
on international humanitarian and human rights law, including oversight and 
accountability mechanisms.
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state regulatory processes. As mentioned earlier, one of the biggest challenges 
to effective regulation was the difficulty states had in enforcing national or 
international law in relation to private security actors. This was the thinking 
behind the first draft, which endeavoured to highlight that the principles and 
standards contained in the code were relevant to PSC operations regardless of 
the situation on the ground – whether it was armed conflict or not. However, 
the ability of states to enforce laws varied significantly from state to state and 
could depend on a number of factors, including the existence of armed conflict or 
other catastrophic situations such as natural disasters, and whether the PSC was 
beyond a state’s jurisdictional reach. Conversely, a state might be in the position 
to regulate and enforce laws against a PSC effectively, in which case the oversight 
function might not be needed.114
The decision to scale back the scope of application also stemmed from a 
resource concern for an eventual oversight mechanism. As overseeing PSCs all 
over the world in all areas where they were operating would be extremely expensive, 
it was desirable to restrict the areas that would be overseen by the mechanism 
to something more cost-effective while still fulfilling the code’s objectives. The 
adoption of a “complex environments” scope of application reflected a balancing 
effort to focus the oversight efforts on those areas that needed it most. This can 
be seen in the final iteration of “complex environments” as contained in the code:
Complex Environments – any areas experiencing or recovering 
from unrest or instability, whether due to natural disasters or armed 
conflicts, where the rule of law has been substantially undermined, 
and in which the capacity of the state authority to handle the situation 
is diminished, limited, or non-existent.
In looking at this definition, it becomes clear that it is the effectiveness of the 
state governance, rather than the capacity of PSCs, that is the defining factor 
for the code’s scope of application. This definition also emphasizes that in other 
“non-complex” areas states hold the primary responsibility of oversight. Although 
it makes logical sense, this approach raises the question of how to determine 
whether or not a given region is considered a “complex environment”. While 
there seems to be a general understanding that this determination will be made 
by the ICOCA, at the time of writing there has been no clear progress as to how 
to make the determination.
2010. This text was then officially adopted at the ICOC signatory conference held 
on 9 November 2010.
As important as the paper outputs of these meetings were the intangibles, 
notably the building of trust. Throughout the numerous meetings, different 
stakeholders developed constructive ways of working – and of solving issues 
– together. Furthermore, the high degree to which the different stakeholders 
shared common or compatible visions for the code helped to move the process 
forward, and at times could be surprising. This is not to say that there were no 
disagreements or differences of opinion, but in nearly all cases participants were 
able to find ways forward through consensus.
A crucial but less obvious element in the success of the process was the role 
of the neutral facilitator,112 who took on tasks ranging from organizational and 
logistical project management activities to research and analysis for the code text 
and identifying and building consensus around challenging issues. The facilitator 
also had an important role in the drafting of the actual code text. Together, 
members of the Swiss government, the Geneva Academy of International 
Humanitarian Law and Human Rights113 and DCAF would meet after workshops 
to sift through and analyse the contents of those discussions, putting together 
draft texts that would then be circulated to the next round of multistakeholder 
meetings for further feedback, starting the process over again.  
Furthermore, the neutral facilitator acted in the role of informal mediator of 
minor points of contention. As an actor with effectively independent funding and 
no agenda beyond developing a successful code, the facilitator was able to help 
build trust among the different stakeholder groups. 
While the underlying objectives of the code process remained constant, the 
approach to implementing it did change and evolve. To help chart these changes, 
it is particularly useful to compare the different drafts of the code, which offer 
snapshots in time of how the thinking of the participating stakeholders evolved 
over the course of the process. There is a substantial difference between the three 
versions of the code which is worth considering in more depth: the scope of its 
application.
In the first draft, the code is said to “apply globally to all circumstances, 
whether or not there is a situation of armed conflict”. This differs substantially 
from the phrase “complex environments” found in the second draft, which is 
very similar to the formulation found the final document. The shift in approach 
reveals the discussions that took place regarding the need for the code in the first 
place, also recognizing the need to support (or at least not undermine) effective 
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take the ICOC into consideration when applying national or international law to a 
PSC, signature of the code was a public commitment by companies to undertake 
further responsibilities, including submitting to another non-standard oversight 
organization.
As discussed further below, developing the governance and oversight 
mechanism proved to be a more difficult nut to crack, taking considerably longer 
than the time spent developing the code. 
Setting relevant standards: The ICOC’s key provisions
The actual text of the code was shaped by the challenges and good ideas identified 
during the multistakeholder consultations as well as by other initiatives. The 
Montreux Document, the “protect, respect and remedy” framework and a 
number of international human rights treaties were identified in the opening 
paragraphs as essential foundations of the ICOC. Turning to the substance, a 
glance at the ICOC table of contents shows clearly that human rights principles 
form the backbone of the document. It is worthwhile – and also revealing of the 
compromises reached during its elaboration – to take a closer look at some key 
provisions adopted in the ICOC.
Rules for the use of force
Paragraphs 30–32, which contain the “rules for the use of force”, offer a telling 
example of both the compromises and the innovative approaches that emerged 
from the multistakeholder discussions. The two primary sources on which these 
paragraphs are based are the standards for the use of force in self-defence accepted 
by most national jurisdictions in criminal law, and the UN Basic Principles on the 
Use of Force and Firearms by Law Enforcement Officials. Paragraph 30 employs 
a common standard for the use of force by private persons in self-defence: force 
used must be “strictly necessary, and should be proportionate to the threat and 
appropriate to the situation”. This language reinforces the notion that PSC 
personnel are civilian in nature, and do not enjoy additional special powers that 
are traditionally accorded to public security personnel.
Paragraph 31 contains an almost verbatim reproduction of the first half of 
paragraph 9 of the UN Basic Principles, with an important change reflecting 
that PSC personnel are not state security actors: omitting the second part of the 
sentence that refers to arrest of persons, a power which commercial security 
providers should not have in the context of private security provision. 
In the end, 58 companies signed the ICOC in Geneva on 9 November 2010. A 
noteworthy element of the signatory conference was stakeholder participation. 
The small number of other stakeholder groups attending the conference, in 
particular human rights CSOs and states, was in stark contrast to their weight 
and influence in developing the ICOC. This can be partially explained by their 
different roles in regard to the code. Unlike signatory companies, participating 
CSOs and states were not undertaking commitments to perform activities in 
accordance with the principles contained in the code. Instead, CSOs had acted as 
a check on the quality and credibility of the code to help ensure that it respected 
international human rights law and IHL in a way that reflected specific concerns 
they had about companies’ operations. States had largely participated in a dual 
capacity: as both regulators with state obligations to uphold and as clients of private 
security services. While both of these stakeholder groups had clear linkages to the 
aims and objectives of the ICOC, at the time of its adoption their participation 
consisted primarily in their substantial contributions to the text. 
However, the multistakeholder character of the initiative was recognized 
more and more towards the end of the code’s development, with the first real 
reference included in paragraph 7 calling for “Signatory Companies, Clients and 
other relevant stakeholders” to establish “external independent mechanisms for 
effective governance and oversight”. Furthermore, on the day after the signatory 
conference three members from each of the stakeholder groups – signatory 
companies, CSOs and governments – were elected to a temporary steering 
committee (TSC) to develop what became known as the ICOC Articles of 
Association, or the framework for the oversight mechanism of the ICOC. Through 
this second process, more active and substantive roles for states and CSOs would 
evolve over the development of the governance and oversight mechanism, with 
each stakeholder group having an equal say in developing and drafting the 
oversight mechanism and the recognition of the process as an MSI. 
While the large initial uptake, and subsequent exponentially larger uptake,115 
was hailed as a resounding success of the ICOC, it is worthwhile considering 
what these companies were signing up to. In a similar fashion to the Montreux 
Document (see the earlier discussion), the ICOC states that “The Code itself 
creates no legal obligations and no legal liabilities on the Signatory Companies, 
beyond those which already exist under national or international law.”116 Here 
again we see the formula of recalling existing legal obligations, followed by an 
interpretation of how those obligations should be applied to the addressees – this 
time to the PSCs themselves. While it is unclear if or how a court of law might 
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assigning the responsibilities member companies have in the code towards their 
own personnel to the personnel of another company providing services under a 
contract of assignment.117
Certification
Throughout the ICOC development process there was much discussion about 
how a PSC could demonstrate compliance with the code in order to be a company 
in “good standing”. There was a general recognition that PSCs would need to 
demonstrate that they had fulfilled the management and policy requirements of 
the code, including elements such as proper selection, vetting and training of 
personnel, management of weapons, incident reporting, grievance procedures 
and human rights impact assessments. Along these lines, the code called for 
the development of “objective and measurable standards... with the objective 
of realizing common and internationally-recognized operational and business 
practices”. At the same time, stakeholders recognized that these elements would 
only suffice for part of the code certification process, and the company would 
be required to undergo continuous “Monitoring, Auditing and verification, 
including in the field, by the governance and oversight mechanism”. One 
related development in regard to certification was a parallel process launched 
by the US Department of Defense to develop an American National Standards 
Institute (ANSI) process for certification of PSCs. Requiring compliance with the 
Montreux Document and the ICOC as well as with numerous standards derived 
from those documents, the resulting PSC.1 standard is the first national standard 
designed to certify a PSC’s systems and policies. Currently, a process is under 
way to develop an International Organization for Standardization (ISO) standard 
offering similar certification at an international level. 
Fostering a corporate culture that respects human rights
Another important objective of the ICOC was to encourage and support a culture of 
respecting human rights within PSCs. To support the responsibility of companies 
to establish “a corporate culture that promotes awareness of and adherence by 
all Personnel to the principles of this Code”,118 a significant number of the code’s 
provisions were devoted to corporate governance practices (paragraphs 44–69), 
and essentially offer guidance to companies on how to carry out due diligence to 
avoid or lower the likelihood of human rights violations. 
Finally, paragraph 32 considers the situation of when private security personnel 
would be formally authorized to assist in the exercise of a state’s law enforcement 
authority. It steers clear of associations with military personnel, instead requiring 
them to “comply with all national and international obligations applicable to 
regular law enforcement officials of that state and, as a minimum, with the 
standards expressed in the United Nations Basic Principles on the Use of Force 
and Firearms by Law Enforcement Officials (1990)”.
In a nutshell, the rules for the use of force contained in the ICOC describe 
a very limited use in cases of self-defence or defence of others – a right to 
use of force held by all civilian persons. Only where a PSC has been formally 
incorporated into a state’s law enforcement authority are powers such as the right 
to use force above this threshold contemplated, and in such a case the PSC would 
essentially become part of the state police apparatus and under its responsibility. 
Importantly, the right to use military force in the context of an armed conflict 
– the so-called “combatant’s privilege” to participate directly in hostilities – is 
not included, thereby reinforcing the civilian nature of PSCs and the norm of a 
distinction between public and private privileges in the use of force.
Subcontractors
The ICOC includes several provisions to help ensure that all subcontractors of 
PSCs should be held accountable to the same requirements and standards as the 
prime contractor, to prevent signatory PSCs from effectively “contracting out” 
of their responsibilities under the code. Paragraphs 16 and 18 state the general 
rule that signatory companies must require all subcontractors and other parties 
carrying out security services under their contracts to comply with the code, and 
that this compliance must be an integral part of contractual agreements with 
subcontractors. Paragraphs 50–51 go into more detail regarding what is required 
of PSCs when selecting and vetting subcontractors, stating that they must 
“exercise due diligence in the selection, vetting and ongoing performance review 
of all subcontractors performing Security Services”.
Furthermore, a number of important terms in the code are defined in such a 
way as to try to close as many gaps as possible in the case of subcontractors. For 
example, the definition of “personnel” makes it clear that persons who perform 
security services for PSCs are considered personnel, whether or not they are 
employees and even if they are not paid. Notably, persons working for another 
company under a contract of assignment to provide security services under a 
member company’s contract are included in the definition of “personnel”, thereby 
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compliance with the ICOC. During the period from the adoption of the ICOC 
in November 2010 until the launch of the oversight mechanism in September 
2013, all that was required of a PSC to become a “signatory company” was to send 
a letter to the Swiss government with a short description of the company and 
the services it offered along with an affirmation that it would provide security 
services in accordance with the code. At this stage there was no fee for signing, 
nor any substantial oversight, check or follow-up on the companies’ submissions. 
There were complaints from all stakeholder groups that companies were being 
awarded a kind of licence without having to do or prove anything substantial 
to obtain it. In fact, in a similar fashion to the critiques of “bluewashing” by 
the UNGC, the ease with which companies could become signatories and the 
lack of additional oversight of or other requirements from the companies (which 
were then listed on a code of conduct website) led to criticism that the ICOC was 
a promotional vehicle for PSCs. Further, there were allegations that companies 
which were not even PSCs – but which provided related services, such as training 
or consulting – had joined as signatories, giving them some free advertising and 
networking opportunities, along with a label proclaiming their supposed human 
rights compliance. 
However, rather than an indication of bad faith or “corporate capture” of the 
initiative, the ambiguity of the code on the oversight and grievance mechanism 
reflected the lack of a clear common vision among the multistakeholder 
participants as to how the code’s approach to handling grievances could work. 
Reflecting the lack of a clear vision for an eventual oversight mechanism, 
statements within the ICOC as to its structure were left deliberately vague, and 
yet included some important elements. Paragraph 7(b) stated that it “will include 
Certification of Signatory Companies’ compliance with the Code’s principles 
and standards derived from the Code… Auditing and Monitoring of their work 
in the field, including Reporting” and, as discussed above, the development of 
a mechanism to address possible violations of the code. Paragraph 11 instructed 
the TSC to elaborate a charter to “outline mandate and governing policies for 
the mechanism”. The ICOC also made a specific requirement that signatory 
companies themselves establish effective internal grievance mechanisms; but 
little detail was offered on how this would work in practice, particularly how such 
internal grievance mechanisms would interface with the external independent 
mechanisms for effective governance and oversight. 
While this section of the code aims to set out the broad principles underpinning 
such efforts, it also contains a significant amount of granularity, identifying 
specific efforts and responsibilities that companies must undertake. In essence 
it aims to strike a delicate balance between encouraging companies to adopt 
and implement the highest standards possible, while nevertheless setting high 
“minimum standards” that should provide assurance of basic compliance with 
the principles. Areas covered in this section include the selection and vetting 
of personnel, training, management of weapons and materiél of war, incident 
reporting and a “safe and healthy working environment”. 
Grievance procedures
The penultimate subsection on grievance procedures contained in paragraphs 
66–68 is another interesting product of compromise. The opening paragraph 
contains the overarching guiding principle: “Signatory Companies will establish 
grievance procedures to address claims alleging failure by the Company to respect 
the principles contained in this Code brought by Personnel or third parties.” The 
following paragraphs go on to list a number of requirements that describe how 
such grievance procedures must be carried out, including that they “must be 
fair, accessible and offer effective remedies”, that allegations will be investigated 
promptly and impartially, and, in the case of finding a violation, that companies 
must “take appropriate disciplinary action, which could include termination 
of employment”. Paragraph 67(g) includes whistle-blowing protections for 
“Personnel who report wrongdoings in good faith”.
What these paragraphs do not do is establish an external oversight grievance 
mechanism, despite the somewhat oblique reference contained in paragraph 
7(b) which calls for the establishment of “external independent mechanisms 
for effective governance and oversight, which will include... execution of a 
mechanism to address alleged violations of the Code’s principles or the standards 
derived from the Code”.119 The decision to postpone development of the oversight 
mechanism until after the ICOC had been finalized was both controversial and 
risky, but most participants felt that from a standard-setting point of view it would 
be important to release the ICOC sooner rather than later so that companies 
could begin the process of ensuring that their operations were in compliance with 
the ICOC.
Postponing the development of the oversight mechanism also meant an 
initial lower threshold for what was required of companies to demonstrate their 
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While this next phase of the process to develop a multistakeholder oversight 
mechanism for the ICOC benefited from the experience gained in developing the 
code, it also further developed and systematized the earlier approach, evolving 
into a more mature process embodied by the TSC. This included developing 
defined rules of procedure, a rotating chair to ensure robust participation by 
all stakeholders, and taking a proactive approach to transparency through the 
development of a website which provided regular updates on TSC activities. The 
TSC also sought the advice of experts who were largely outside the process, but 
who could bring ideas and examples from other relevant initiatives. All these 
procedural improvements and additional resources were very much needed to 
support the development of a governance framework which ended up taking 
twice the time originally envisioned in the ICOC, and which still left many details 
to be worked out by the resulting oversight body. At the same time, a new trend of 
requiring code compliance by companies through national law, public and private 
procurement policies and in contracts for private security services has helped to 
“harden” an essentially soft law process.
Through tremendous work that ultimately coalesced into a common vision, 
the TSC created a new kind of multistakeholder oversight institution that aims 
to achieve the stated objective of providing effective oversight of PSCs with 
some teeth. It is still left to be seen if it will provide a plausible answer to the 
However, the process undertaken to develop the ICOC had already provided 
a strong basis for the next stage of the process. It demonstrated that different 
stakeholders could work together constructively to build consensus around the 
most pressing challenges posed by and to the industry, as well as to articulate 
standards of conduct to respond to those challenges. More importantly, it evolved 
into a consultative model in which participants were regularly consulted and 
asked to provide feedback on an evolving draft that was shepherded by the neutral 
facilitator. This approach helped to build and maintain trust in the process among 
the different participating stakeholders, and provided a good blueprint for the 
next phase to develop an oversight mechanism.
Building an Effective 
Oversight Mechanism
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news and information on ICOC-related events. In the words of TSC CSO member 
Meg Roggensack, “This was an unprecedented level of transparency during a 
challenging formative stage; it helped to maintain a degree of ongoing awareness 
and engagement that informed the TSC’s work and that led to an emphasis in the 
charter on the value of regular public reporting and transparency about ICOCA’s 
work.”123
In approaching the task of developing the ICOCA, the TSC also had guidance 
from the ICOC, which included a timeline124 for achieving certain milestones. 
The first of these, to develop a “workplan for constituting the mechanism by 
March 2011”,125 was delegated to a smaller working group, composed of members 
from industry and civil society, to produce a first draft. This approach of 
delegating distinct tasks to smaller groups, typically including a member from 
each stakeholder group, to then be presented to and reviewed/amended by the 
entire multistakeholder body became a standard way of working for the TSC. By 
using this approach, the TSC was able to develop a workplan and a discussion 
paper on “Elements of a Governance and Oversight Mechanism for the ICOC”126 
by the March 2011 deadline. However, despite these efforts and the decision to 
meet at least once a month, with smaller working groups meeting more frequently, 
the sheer complexity of the process to design an effective multistakeholder 
governance and oversight mechanism required much more time and work than 
was foreseen in the code.
In the first meetings of the TSC there were already some emerging areas of 
consensus regarding the functions of the governance and oversight mechanism, 
in particular that it should have some sort of accreditation function as well as 
an ombudsman function.127 However, the TSC members recognized that they 
required more expertise and input into the process than they alone possessed. 
For this reason, they reached out to the larger stakeholder communities to create 
three multistakeholder working groups composed of experts with specific subject-
matter expertise128 to consider in more depth the following areas:
 • assessment, reporting and internal and external oversight (Working Group 1)
 • resolution of third-party grievances (Working Group 2)
 • independent governance and oversight mechanism structure, governance and 
funding (Working Group 3).
Each working group met, primarily via teleconference, between six and 11 times 
during the summer months of 2011.129 Drawing on a broader spectrum of 
question posed at the beginning of this paper: how can a non-state institution 
effectively oversee PSCs?
Preparing the ground for an oversight mechanism
As its first order of business, the newly formed TSC developed rules of procedure120 
that put into written form many of the ways of working that had evolved organically 
during the ICOC process, developing them even further. In practical terms this 
meant designing a process that strongly favoured decision-making by consensus, 
but also included the possibility of having a vote in the event that consensus 
could not be reached. The rules of procedure distinguished between two types of 
votes, “procedural” and “substantive”, and further stated that “Deciding whether 
a matter is procedural or substantive is itself a substantive matter.”121 Those 
matters qualifying as procedural, described as along the lines of “adoption of 
minutes or reports or establishment of subcommittees”, only required a simple 
majority vote of those present. However, for matters considered to be substantive 
a successful vote required a two-thirds majority of those members present, 
“with at least one Participant from each stakeholder group voting in favour”. In 
what came to be known as the “Dutton majority”, named after the Australian 
government TSC member David Dutton who suggested it, this qualified voting 
requirement assured that no vote would be agreed by the TSC in the case that one 
stakeholder pillar was wholly opposed. In practical terms, the threat of this vote 
meant that no vote was actually ever taken by the TSC. Instead, all decisions were 
ultimately reached by consensus, even if the road taken to reach this point was 
quite long and sometimes contentious, requiring compromises and new ways 
of thinking from all sides. Reflecting the multistakeholder character of the TSC, 
it was decided to adopt a rotating-chair approach, whereby the chairmanship 
would cycle through each of the three stakeholder groups before starting over 
again. The chair of the meeting had the tasks of preparing, in cooperation with 
the project facilitator, the meeting’s agenda and presiding over the meeting itself. 
S/he also was tasked to “work closely together” with the chairs of the previous 
and subsequent meetings “to ensure continuity”,122 meaning that a member from 
each stakeholder group was involved. This encouraged active involvement from 
all participants. 
Finally, in an effort to increase transparency of the process, DCAF as neutral 
facilitator established a website for the ICOC to inform the public about the TSC’s 
work. Acting as a clearinghouse of information, the website contained the minutes 
from TSC meetings, copies of reports and other working documents, and other 
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 • a referral function, or a service to refer complaining parties to appropriate exter- 
nal complaints forums, such as a company’s internal grievance mechanism or 
relevant state authorities;
 • a mediation function to mediate disputes between personnel and management 
or between third-party complainants and companies;
 • an arbitration function, or an alternative dispute resolution mechanism that 
could provide binding decisions for participating parties;
 • a special audit function that would provide a special audit or review with a view 
to identifying whether complaints or other indicators of non-compliance are 
symptomatic of broader problems with a company’s policies and practices that 
might warrant reconsideration of its certification status under the ICOC;
 • a fact-finding function, or a process to address specific violations of the code 
by identifying and analysing specific facts and then jointly developing a 
remediation plan with the concerned company; 
 • a gatekeeping function, which refers to the method by which the oversight 
mechanism decides which complaints it will accept and process – important 
elements to consider within this would include subject matter of the complaint, 
credibility of the complaint and consideration of alternative processes. 
In so doing, the group looked closely at several other non-judicial grievance 
mechanisms, including the World Bank Group (office of the compliance adviser/
ombudsman), the OECD (national contact points) and the FLA (third-party 
complaints procedure), as well as at the work of the UN special representative for 
business and human rights on effective non-judicial grievance mechanisms, in 
particular paragraph 31 of the UN Guiding Principles for Business and Human 
Rights.131
Nearly all the elements considered by Working Group 2 were included in the 
ICOCA AOA in some form. The advisory function, essentially a function whereby 
the oversight mechanism provides advice to member companies on a number of 
code-related issues, can be found in Article 13.1 of the AOA. Similarly, the referral 
and mediation functions as part of the ICOCA’s “good offices” are included 
under Article 13.2.1–13.2.5. While not so named, the fact-finding, special audit and 
gatekeeping functions considered by Working Group 2 are largely covered under 
provisions contained in both Article 12 (Reporting, Monitoring and Assessing 
Performance) and Article 13 (Complaints Process).132 The only function clearly not 
adopted within the AOA was that of arbitration, which was considered to be too 
expensive and complicated, as well as more likely to interfere with local investiga-
expertise, the working group discussions helped to lay the foundation for the 
future ICOCA Articles of Association (AOA).
Working Group 1 tackled the core functions of the oversight mechanism, 
including assessments, reporting and internal/external oversight. In addition to 
holding meetings where all its members were able to participate, Working Group 
1 created three subgroups, each tasked with a particular focus: standards-based 
assessment and certification; principles-based monitoring and performance 
assessment; and terminology, reporting and ICOC process. Over the course of 
their discussions, Working Group 1 and its subgroups explored in great detail 
the process of certification of companies, performance assessment/monitoring 
and reporting. Many of the results of their deliberations went on to shape the 
structure and form of the ICOCA, including the following:
 • Gaining ICOCA membership requires undergoing two processes: certification 
of systems, policies and processes (ICOCA Article 11); and ongoing monitoring 
and evaluation of performance, risk and impact (ICOCA Article 12).
 • The oversight mechanism must have the authority to suspend/revoke status/
remove a company for failure to meet ICOC requirements, including those 
listed above (ICOCA Articles 8.1.5, 12.2.7 and 13.2.7).
 • The oversight mechanism has the ultimate responsibility of determining the 
standards used in assessing implementation of the code (ICOCA Article 11).
Other areas in which the group recognized the need for further discussion 
included the frequency of and appropriate trigger(s) for field monitoring by the 
oversight mechanism, as well as precise methods and procedures for conducting 
effective “remote monitoring”. While there were many subsequent discussions on 
these matters, the specific guidelines and procedures for monitoring were passed 
on to the board of the ICOCA, to be developed after the association was created.130
Working Group 2 tackled the issue of grievance mechanisms by considering 
seven possible functions that could be performed by an oversight mechanism: 
 • an advisory function to provide advice about what the code requires of member 
companies to be in compliance, including how to develop/implement an 
internal grievance mechanism that is compliant with paragraphs 66–67 of the 
ICOC, and to give guidance on how IHL and human rights laws apply to PSCs;
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this first public comment period, a number of briefings on the document were 
held in several venues for the TSC to present the draft charter to a wide variety of 
stakeholders and engage them in an interactive discussion about it.135 
More than 800 comments from nearly 40 entities were received on the 
draft, beginning yet another intense period of work to amend the text. At the 
same time, the TSC held several outreach meetings in May and June 2012 to 
discuss its takeaways from the comments face to face with other stakeholders, 
and verify that it was on the right track in the second draft. The TSC also created 
multistakeholder subgroups to work on specific sections of the draft, each of 
which met on a separate schedule.136 The second draft charter for the oversight 
mechanism was released for public consideration in January 2013, serving as the 
basis for discussion at a drafting conference held in Montreux in February 2013. 
In turning to the content of the adopted AOA, it is illuminating to see how some 
key provisions evolved along the way from the first draft.
During the two years or so that the TSC worked to develop the founding 
instrument for the ICOCA, its thinking shifted significantly, based in large part 
on the feedback received from the wider stakeholder communities. This is clearly 
evidenced when looking at the drafts released in January 2012 and January 2013, 
which vary substantially in their approaches. The AOA adopted in February 2013 
had only minor changes from the January 2013 draft and, unless specifically 
noted, can be considered to be substantially the same. 
One of the most obvious differences between the first and second drafts is 
the length of the two documents. At 26 pages the first draft is more than twice 
as long as the second draft, which measures a modest 11 pages. This reflects the 
changing thinking of the TSC on what a charter document should contain in 
terms of detail and direction, and is also a direct result of the feedback received 
after the first draft was published.  
Receiving feedback along the lines that the first draft was long-winded, 
duplicative and confusing, the TSC went back to the drawing board, with the 
objective of simplifying and streamlining the text, retaining important elements 
but providing more latitude to the executive director and multistakeholder board 
to carry out monitoring and review of company performance, and eliminating 
the “chief of performance assessment” position, which had the primary respon-
sibility of reviewing alleged violations of the ICOC.137 The second draft left the 
detailed procedures for implementing certification, monitoring and handling 
third-party complaints to the future board and general assembly to develop and 
adopt. The final AOA are better understood when read with the first draft charter 
tions as its fact-finding processes could impede existing parallel judicial investi-
gations. Most importantly, the oversight and grievance mechanisms are designed 
to remediate company performance and provide remedies to injured parties in 
accordance with the human rights standards contained in the ICOC. Therefore, 
even in cases where companies are subject to state jurisdictions where the rule 
of law is weakened, members of the ICOCA will be held accountable to the “high 
minimum” standards contained in the ICOC. 
Working Group 3 examined areas of structure, governance and funding 
of an oversight mechanism. It is perhaps in the discussions of this working 
group133 that one can see the most change, with the gradual push and pull moving 
from an industry-led initiative to a multistakeholder approach to governance. 
Questions included where the institution should be located (possible locales 
were Switzerland, the US or the UK), who would be eligible for membership of 
the oversight institution (probable answer at this time: only companies), how to 
choose the “right” kind of civil society participants to ensure their independence 
and real commitment to human rights protection, and how decisions should 
be taken (simple majority, qualified majority, etc.). Several areas of emerging 
consensus will now sound familiar to those who have read the AOA. For example, 
in terms of institutional bodies the basic contours of the future ICOCA were laid 
out: the board, the plenary (now known as the general assembly) and a secretariat. 
More importantly, one of the key elements not in question was that the governing 
body of the board should be multistakeholder in its composition. 
The various processes undertaken to share expertise and identify elements 
are important not only for their contributions to the ICOCA, but also because it 
is through these processes that the different stakeholders came to understand the 
value of working collaboratively together, leading to the ICOC initiative becoming 
an MSI.
Developing the ICOC Association
The TSC then set about the task of putting down on paper a first draft for the 
creation of the ICOCA.134 Once again, the TSC created a multistakeholder subgroup 
supported by the neutral facilitator to draft sections of the text in between monthly 
meetings where they would be reviewed and amended by the whole group. It also 
adopted the practice of holding weekly teleconference calls to discuss the progress 
of the drafting subgroup and offer suggestions and other support. Finally, on 16 
January 2012, the first version of the ICOCA AOA, or the “draft charter” as it was 
called then, was released for public comment until the end of March 2012. During 
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conditions for becoming a board member beyond being a participating member 
of the stakeholder pillar. 
Another striking difference between the two charters was the shift in the 
relative responsibilities of the institution’s organs, from a governance model where 
the board was the “primary decision-making body”143 and the annual plenary was 
limited to ratifying a very limited, mostly non-substantive, number of decisions 
that had already been approved by the board144 to one where the plenary (now 
the general assembly) was the “supreme governing body” whose approval was 
required for a number of key decisions to enter into force.145 As such, the balance 
of power shifted from being almost completely dominated by the board to being 
more distributed between the board and the whole membership. This was due 
in part to the choice of an association located in Switzerland as the institutional 
form for the oversight mechanism, which required the general assembly to have a 
few key powers, including the power to dismiss the board, providing an important 
check on its functions.146 However, the powers accorded to the general assembly 
went far beyond what was required under Swiss law, reflecting a fundamental shift 
in the thinking of the institution itself: from a model in which only PSCs could 
be members (and therefore vote in the plenary), with the important decisions 
undertaken by the multistakeholder representation contained in the board, to a 
model where both the general assembly and the board were structured in a multi-
stakeholder configuration, meaning that all decisions required multistakeholder 
participation and approval. When compared to the first draft charter, the AOA for 
the ICOCA, adopted by consensus at the drafting conference held in Montreux 
in February 2013, implemented a purer form of “multistakeholderism” in their 
approach to governance and oversight of the private security sector.
Regarding another stakeholder, non-state clients, as mentioned earlier 
several were approached and participated fairly actively in the beginning of the 
ICOC project. While they continued to be invited to various outreach events, and 
a few provided comments on the drafts of the ICOC, their response during the 
second half of the initiative was cordial but more at arm’s length. Taking a “wait 
and see” approach that the ICOC was an interesting project but they would wait 
for the result before getting more involved, they effectively took themselves out of 
the main stakeholder groupings, a development that was criticized particularly by 
companies and some governments.  
As work shifted from the ICOC to the ICOCA oversight mechanism, with 
some notable exceptions147 non-state clients continued to take a more passive than 
active role, despite the work being arguably more relevant to their own operations. 
as background, because this helps to shed light on the thinking of the TSC behind 
certain provisions contained in the AOA as well as providing some ideas for how 
they could be implemented.138
One noteworthy area where the second draft charter pulled back from the first 
draft in detail is in the criteria for CSOs to join the oversight mechanism. This 
reflects the sometimes contentious ongoing debate about what is the “right kind” 
of CSO to participate in the initiative. While it was fairly clear what was required 
of PSCs and governments to join their respective stakeholder groups – PSCs 
were any person or entity offering private security services, and governments 
were recognized as being responsible for effective control over their territories139 
– CSOs did not have such clear defining qualities other than being NGOs. 
Starting from the premise that the added value of CSOs in this initiative 
was primarily the credibility and expertise they brought by being independent 
organizations working in a watchdog capacity to promote respect for human 
rights and humanitarian law, the first draft charter went into considerable detail 
in spelling out indicators for independence (or lack thereof), and requiring that 
CSOs be recommended and approved by at least three of the four CSO board 
representatives – a requirement that many balked at as being too subjective. The 
second draft charter and final AOA took the approach of stating the overarching 
requirements that CSOs have a “demonstrated institutional record… of the 
promotion and protection of human rights, international humanitarian law or the 
rule of law”140 and that they be independent, which “shall be assessed by reference 
to relationships with other stakeholder pillars, such as via specific, relevant or 
substantial funding, or through active working relationships”.141 The AOA tasked 
the future board to “propose for approval by the General Assembly membership 
requirements” within six months of adoption of the AOA.142
In order to become a member of the board, one must be a member of the 
ICOCA and then elected according to procedures that are developed within each 
stakeholder pillar. For example, to put itself up as a candidate for an industry 
board seat, a member must receive recommendations from at least three other 
industry members. Furthermore, industry representative elections are organized 
regionally, with slots for representatives of UK and US companies – the two 
regions from which the largest number of PSCs hail – another slot for companies 
from outside the UK and US, and a fourth “at large” member, representing the 
company that got the highest number of votes outside those categories. Since 
the CSO and governmental pillars are significantly smaller, there are fewer 
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within each pillar of the general assembly, independent of how many members 
each pillar contained. 
Regarding votes in the board of directors, the AOA continued in the tradition 
of the TSC rules of procedure by adopting a weighted majority vote approach 
similar to and inspired by the earlier “Dutton majority”. Successful votes within 
the board required that decisions be adopted with a majority of eight out of 12 
votes, which must include a minimum of two out of four votes from each of the 
three stakeholder pillars. 
Both of these approaches help to ensure that all three stakeholder pillars 
are able to influence decision-making, and also that votes will not pass if one 
stakeholder pillar is wholly against a measure. Based on the prior experience in 
developing the ICOC and ICOCA, it is hoped that this weighted voting structure 
will also support building and taking decisions by consensus, and early meetings 
of the board seem encouraging in this regard.
Article 10: Advisory Forum of Montreux Document participants
Reflecting the need expressed by some governments for a way in which to provide 
input to the ICOCA without becoming formal members of the association, Article 
10 calls for the creation of the Advisory Forum of Montreux Document Participants. 
Entrusted with the broad mandate of “provid[ing] advice to the Association on 
national and international policy and regulatory matters”, the advisory forum was 
conceived to be a platform from which states that had endorsed the Montreux 
Document could feed into the ICOCA. However, beyond this very general 
purpose, there was little detail offered as to what such a body should look like, 
how it should function or by what mechanisms it would interact with the ICOCA. 
 To date these questions have not been fully answered, but there has been 
some progress on the development of the forum. The “Montreux Document 
Forum” was announced at a conference held in honour of the fifth anniversary 
of the Montreux Document in December 2013. At that meeting, and subsequent 
meetings held over the course of 2014, a consensus emerged to form a distinct 
working group within the Montreux Document Forum in order to fulfil the 
function described in Article 10 of the ICOCA AOA. This was done in large part 
to meet the concerns of some Montreux Document participating states, such 
as South Africa, which did not wish to participate in the advisory function to 
the ICOCA. While at the time of writing it is too early to tell how the Montreux 
Forum and its working group will contribute to the ICOCA, it does provide a 
conduit through which a more diverse group of states can provide input to the 
Furthermore, considering the important role of these clients in giving some “teeth” 
through requiring compliance with the ICOC as part of their contracting policies, it 
is clear that they should have participated more actively in the processes. However, 
after the first draft of the ICOCA charter was released in January 2012 several 
multinational corporations, primarily from the extractive sector, became more 
active in the process and were able to contribute to some extent to the resulting 
document. At the time of writing, the board of the ICOCA is engaged in outreach 
efforts to bring non-state clients more closely into the process.
Setting up governance structures: The Articles of Association
The “multistakeholder approach” to designing more effective elements of gov- 
ernance is able in many instances to find new and creative ways to address 
governance gaps, as illustrated by the following key provisions.
As previously mentioned, the concept of membership within the ICOCA 
changed substantially, from the principle that only PSCs could join as members 
of the association but would be governed by a multistakeholder board to a model 
where both board participation and general assembly membership would be 
multistakeholder. The earlier thinking was coloured by the perception that this 
was an “industry-led” initiative, flowing from the fact that the industry had asked 
for such an initiative, and that PSCs were the primary addresses of the ICOC 
and the only stakeholder group clearly undertaking responsibilities to operate in 
compliance with the code. However, in the year between the first public draft of 
the AOA (January 2012) and the second draft (January 2013) the TSC decoupled 
the notion that “undertaking responsibilities” under the ICOC was necessary 
for having membership responsibilities within the association. Indeed, the fact 
that the process to develop the ICOCA accorded equal decision-making power 
to all three stakeholder groups from the start was strong evidence that the other 
stakeholders had clear interests and responsibilities within the initiative. Along 
with this realization that all stakeholders had a reason to join the club came a 
more elegant way of taking decisions within the ICOCA.
Allowing all three stakeholders to participate in the general assembly allows 
them to vote on decisions, but in the very likely case that one stakeholder pillar is 
populated by disproportionately more members, this comes with the risk of that 
stakeholder group drowning out the votes of the other stakeholders, meaning 
that the other stakeholders’ opinions would not have much impact on decisions. 
The TSC tackled this problem by creating a tripartite or three-pillar structure in 
the general assembly, requiring that for a vote to be successful, it had to succeed 
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procedures, processes and resources. Examples of company processes that 
make up part of a QMS include internal audits, corrective action and preventive 
action.148 To be certified under a QMS, an organization must demonstrate that it 
has defined these processes, and explain how they are sequenced and how they 
interact with each other. Certifications of companies to the standard are typically 
carried out by auditors working for certification bodies.
As stakeholders were divided over the extent to which certification to the 
ANSI PSC.1 standard could fulfil certification requirements under the ICOC as 
defined by the ICOCA, a compromise was reached that is reflected in the language 
quoted above, leaving open the possibility that certification under a national or 
international standard could be used to fulfil requirements for certification under 
the ICOCA, but that the multistakeholder board would decide to what extent this 
would occur and would also have the power to define additional requirements.149
  
Article 12: Reporting, monitoring and assessing performance
The subject of much less controversy, Article 12 requires that the board should 
develop these procedures, specifying that they must use “established human rights 
methodologies”. It then goes on in some detail to give an overview of the kinds of 
reporting and monitoring envisaged. To these ends, it requires member companies 
to “provide to the Association a written assessment of their performance pursuant 
to a transparent set of criteria”, and empowers the executive director to initiate 
field monitoring, “unless the Board decides otherwise”, in cases where there is 
an identified need for more extensive monitoring, including “field based review”, 
or where a member of the association (either company, state or civil society) has 
made a request. All alleged violations of the code must be referred by the executive 
director to the board, which will review them and offer any observations and 
advice to the concerned member company it deems pertinent. If the board finds 
that corrective action is necessary to remedy a member company’s non-compli-
ance with the code, it will enter into a process to bring this about. Thus even the 
executive director and secretariat have important roles in overseeing companies, 
carried out in close cooperation with the multistakeholder board.
Article 13: Complaints process
Article 13 describes an approach that aims to give effect to the ICOC requirement 
that grievance procedures “must be fair, accessible and offer effective remedies”150 
in the face of limited financial resources. Essentially, Article 13 describes a process 
in which either the implicated member company or the secretariat receives 
association, and as such forms another link in the overlapping network of diverse 
actors working together to promote better governance and implementation of 
international standards.
Article 11: Certification
While much of the detail was left to the future ICOCA board to develop, the 
AOA did set out certain requirements for how the association must carry out its 
functions to ensure a multistakeholder governance approach. In Article 11 the AOA 
specify that “The Board shall develop procedures for this Article... and submit 
them to the General Assembly for approval.” As the voting structures require 
significant support within each stakeholder group in order to take decisions, this 
helps to ensure that such procedures will be developed with balanced input from 
all three stakeholder groups. Furthermore, taking into account the certification 
requirements of ICOC paragraph 7, the ICOCA goes on to say:
The Board shall define the certification requirements based on 
national or international standards and processes that are recognized 
by the Board as consistent with the Code and specifying any additional 
information relevant to the human rights and humanitarian impact 
of operations it deems necessary...
This gave the multistakeholder board the last word in defining certification 
requirements under the code.
This innocuous language belies both the significant amount of division 
certification requirements caused among stakeholders and the considerable effort 
required to achieve compromise and consensus. In early 2011 the US Department 
of Defense launched an initiative that endeavoured to establish “objective and 
measurable standards for providing Security Services based upon this Code”. 
In pursuing this objective, the Department of Defense contracted with ANSI to 
develop a national quality management system based on the Montreux Document 
and the ICOC. The standard developed through this process, PSC.1, was finalized 
in spring 2012.
ANSI PSC.1 takes a form similar to ISO 9001 and other similar quality 
management system (QMS) standards, incorporating the principles and standards 
contained within the ICOC and the Montreux Document. For those not familiar 
with these kinds of standards, a QMS can be described as a collection of business 
processes as expressed in the implementing organization’s structure, policies, 
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order to demonstrate the association’s financial viability for the information of 
prospective members.
The note also opens a window into the thinking of the TSC on how the ICOCA 
AOA would be operationalized as a functioning oversight organization. In the 
“Workload” section of this document, the TSC explains that it expects the first two 
years of the association’s operations to be devoted to developing the procedures 
for the functions set out in Articles 11 (Certification), 12 (Reporting, Monitoring 
and Assessing Performance) and 13 (Complaints Process). The note goes on to 
say that the ICOCA would probably not become fully operational until the third 
year, and further that it will likely take several more years for these procedures to 
mature. 
Because of this expected work-stream, the TSC believed there would be 
an “inelastic relationship between the number of member companies and the 
workload of the Association during the first two years”, as its efforts would be 
largely devoted to developing the procedures – tasks that are not very much 
dependent on the number of member companies – rather than implementing 
them, when the level of increased costs would be very much dependent upon 
the number of companies joining the association. This explains in large part the 
approach for member company dues, the first two years of which are set out in 
the chart below.
Subscription level Revenue Joining fee Year 1 Year 2
Company Level 1 $ 0–3 million $ 1,000 $ 2,500 $ 3,000
Company Level 2 $ 3–20 million $ 1,000 $ 5,000 $ 6,000
Company Level 3 Over $20 million $ 1,000 $ 9,000 $ 10,000152
The note goes on to say that it would expect industry dues to rise after the first 
two years of operation, “as company members realise increasing benefits from 
membership and as the Association becomes fully operational”.153
Beyond industry dues, the note considers other sources of funding, in 
particular pledges made by governments (Swiss, UK, US and Australian) and the 
possibility that CSOs could bring in financial support from foundations for those 
functions related to the human rights objectives of the association and the code. 
Finally, income from non-voting observers to the association – a category still to 
be developed by the board – is presented as another possible revenue stream.
complaints of code violations by a member company that harm one or more 
individuals, and then informs the complainant of the various available grievance 
mechanisms that can offer an effective remedy, including but not limited to the 
company’s own internal grievance mechanism required under Article 67 of 
the ICOC. Where a complainant alleges that the company’s internal grievance 
mechanism does not offer an effective remedy, or otherwise is not in compliance 
with Article 67, this is reviewed by the secretariat and can have several follow-on 
effects, including recommending the complainant to other grievance mechanisms 
such as mediation or use of the “Association’s good offices”, and review of the 
member company’s grievance mechanism by both the secretariat and the board. 
If the latter procedures find the company’s grievance mechanism lacking, this 
triggers a dialogue with the company to implement corrective action to bring the 
grievance mechanism into compliance with the code; and if the company fails to 
take reasonable corrective action within a specified period or to cooperate in good 
faith the board must take action, which can include suspension or termination of 
membership.
Finance
Often dominating meetings to the detriment of more substantive issues, finance – 
specifically how much the oversight mechanism would cost, and most importantly 
who would pay – was a critically important element of discussions. While there 
was a general understanding that member PSCs would have to bear a significant 
share of the costs, opinions varied as to the percentage that share should be. 
To that end, a finance working group developed the “TSC Note on Financing 
the ICoCA”,151 which aimed to set out initial expectations for the costs and financing 
of the organization. This note included:
 • information on the government funding likely to be available during the first 
five years of the association’s operation; 
 • a recommended fee schedule for industry members for the first two years of 
the association’s operations, for action by the general assembly at the launch 
conference (in accordance with Articles 6.4.4 and 14.2); 
 • a recommended budget for the first year of the association’s operations for 
the board’s consideration immediately following the launch conference (in 
accordance with Article 8.1.1); 
 • an indicative model of the association’s budget over its first five years, including 
costs such as necessary personnel and likely numbers of field-based reviews, in 
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guidelines at the end of 2012 for the hiring and use of PSCs. The guidelines 
detail a number of requirements for hiring PSCs, including those on screening, 
training and use of force, as well as outlining management and oversight respon-
sibilities towards the PSCs. Of note, the guidelines require as a prerequisite for 
engagement that the PSC be a member of the ICOCA, and specifically that it meet 
the requirements of the ICOC in the areas of use of force and weapons handling. 
While at the time of writing it is too early to draw conclusions about the impact 
of the UN guidelines on the private security industry, companies operating from 
one region have been signing up to the code in clusters in response to requests 
for proposals to provide security services to a UN operation in the same region. 
This serves to highlight the power of the client to require adherence to an MSI 
as a prerequisite for making a bid to provide services, with “hard” or binding 
obligations being found in the contract.
The UK government and the Security in Complex Environments Group
As mentioned earlier, the SCEG is a novel public-private partnership between 
the UK government and an industry body. Currently this organization requires 
its members to agree to abide by the ICOC and the UN Guiding Principles on 
Business and Human Rights, and to demonstrate intent to become certified 
under ANSI PSC.1. These efforts to articulate human rights standards and some 
form of accountability for the private security industry demonstrate the industry’s 
belief that a commitment to ethical and accountable practices is necessary for the 
success of its business.
US government PSC procurement policies
The US government has taken an active participatory role in developing both the 
ICOC and the ICOCA and publicly pledged its support, including by providing 
financial support.157 Furthermore, the US Department of State has indicated 
its plan to require membership of the ICOCA in its procurement policies.158 
However, the US Department of Defense has taken a different position, requiring 
“conformance” with the ANSI PSC.1 standard, which as discussed incorporates 
requirements from the ICOC and the Montreux Document. It is not clear whether 
such “conformance” necessarily requires certification to PSC.1 by a certification 
body, or whether there is another means by which such conformance can be 
demonstrated. Currently, certification to PSC.1 is only offered by two certification 
bodies, both located in the UK, resulting in limited capacity to obtain certification. 
Nevertheless, the inclusion of ICOC principles and standards in PSC.1 and in 
Taking all these elements into consideration, the TSC offers in the note a “Five-year 
indicative model”. While the long list of assumptions and caveats preceding this 
model underscores its conjectural nature, it does accomplish one important 
objective: reassuring companies and other potential members that a working 
association was viable with the amount of funding it was likely to receive.
Another important aspect of this note was the presentation of a multistake-
holder approach to funding. While many in the process seemed to assume that 
industry members would bear the brunt of funding, this model portrays states as 
providing slightly more, with potential revenue streams coming from other actors. 
In this “indicative model”, industry is portrayed as bearing around 43 per cent of 
costs, states 48 per cent and CSOs and other actors around 9 per cent. It is the 
author’s opinion that having diversified sources of revenue adds to the credibility 
of the oversight mechanism. Such a model responds in part to criticisms about 
the industry membership fees being too low,154 as states are expected to provide 
slightly more of the funding, and in any case membership dues are expected to 
rise as operations get into full swing.
The ICOC as a point of reference for new regulatory initiatives
In response to the development and launch of the ICOCA, several new regulatory 
initiatives on both national and international levels have been created which 
depend in part on the ICOC and the governance and oversight functions of the 
ICOCA. These initiatives make compliance with the ICOC/membership in the 
ICOCA a requirement either as a matter of law or as a prerequisite for obtaining 
private security contracts with the state or an international organization.155 These 
co-regulatory approaches combine the advantages of an international-level 
multistakeholder governance model with the force of statutory and/or contractual 
obligations, potentially helping to fill some of the governance gaps identified at 
the start of this paper and making the “soft law” approach of the ICOC initiative 
somewhat harder. Furthermore, such efforts cut against the voluntariness of the 
ICOC, in that if PSCs want access to these markets, they must join the ICOCA 
and/or demonstrate compliance with the ICOC.
The UN guidelines on the use of armed security services by PSCs
Beyond providing a forum to draft international standards and agreements, 
the UN is also an important consumer of private security services to support 
its operations around the world.156 To minimize the negative impacts that PSCs 
can have on UN missions, the UN Department of Safety and Security adopted 
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or operating from Swiss territory providing private security and related services 
outside Switzerland and European Union/European Free Trade Area states. At 
the time of writing the ordinance providing implementing instructions for this 
law had just been released;159 once they are fully operational, these will provide 
more information about the impact of the law. Of particular note, the ordinance 
gives a more developed definition of complex environments, and establishes a 
regulatory authority to review whether the relevant services provided by affected 
PSCs are in compliance with Swiss law.
The overall effect
The process of developing an MSI really matured during the second phase of 
establishing the ICOCA mechanism. The more structured approach driven by 
an active and committed TSC and supported by the neutral facilitator resulted in 
the development of a governance framework that aims to ensure balanced and 
accountable decision-making by members of both the board and the plenary. The 
number of client organizations at national and international levels which are now 
requiring PSC membership in the ICOC also demonstrates a level of confidence 
in the initiative’s approach to setting standards and holding companies to account 
to those standards. Time will tell, however, if the initiative is successful in its 
overarching objective: “to promote the responsible provision of security services 
and respect for human rights and national and international law in accordance 
with the Code”.160
the upcoming ISO standard offers yet another regulatory framework, helping to 
reinforce and harmonize international standards and norms for the provision of 
private security services. 
Australian government PSC procurement policies
The Australian government’s Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade (DFAT) 
has included requirements in its procurement regulations for the PSCs it engages 
in conflict environments. It requires that they be signatories to the ICOC, or state 
their willingness to become signatories, as a condition of tender. Further, the 
DFAT requires that PSCs demonstrate compliance directly to the department 
with a number of requirements consistent with those of the ICOC, including that 
the PSC does the following:
 • obtains all necessary and appropriate licences from the relevant authorities; 
 • formulates and implements recruitment/vetting and ongoing training 
programmes that are consistent with both the Montreux Document and the 
ICOC;
 • formulates, implements and maintains standard operating procedures that 
make reference to, and are consistent with, the Montreux Document and the 
ICOC;
 • puts in place accountability mechanisms that address improper or unlawful 
conduct;
 • provides reports demonstrating compliance with the Montreux Document and 
the ICOC;
 • complies with relevant Australian laws and the laws of the territorial state; 
 • adheres to the highest standards of ethical behaviour and conduct, consistent 
with the standards required of Australian public service officials serving 
overseas.
By requiring as a condition of tender adherence to the ICOC as well as 
demonstrated compliance with a number of ICOC-consistent requirements, the 
Australian DFAT is helping to reinforce the ICOC standards while also providing 
its own direct oversight over certain elements that are consistent with the code.
The Swiss Federal Act on Private Security Services Provided Abroad
Taking the multistakeholder initiative to another level, this Swiss law requires 
membership in the ICOCA of private security companies either domiciled in 
64 65 Towards an International Code of Conduct for Private Security ProvidersAnne-Marie Buzatu
expert working groups and conferences that resulted in several rounds of draft 
documents. Importantly, it is through these many occasions to discuss challenges 
and exchange ideas – leading to consensus on how to meet them – that trust 
among different stakeholders is slowly built. An iterative process that advances on 
the basis of small victories and developing consensus as stakeholders get to know 
each other allows the agreement to emerge in a series of small, forward-moving 
steps. This is essential to bridge differences and support productive discussions 
that can lead to the fulfilment of the initiative’s objectives. This cannot be skipped 
over or fast-tracked, and is likely the single most important factor for success in 
developing an MSI.
The building of trust is also supported through adopting governance 
structures that allow for equally weighted participation and decision-making from all 
involved stakeholder groups,161 sometimes called true or real multistakeholderism.162 
For example, the TSC was made up of nine voting representatives, three from each 
stakeholder group, each of whom had an equal weight and voice in discussions. 
However, when taking decisions the requirement that there be some support from 
all three stakeholder groups helped to ensure that all decisions would be multi-
stakeholder in character. In practical terms, adopting a weighted majority voting 
process supported decision-making by consensus. This ultimately encouraged new 
thinking and often resulted in innovative approaches that could build consensus. 
Furthermore, the practice of rotating the TSC chair among all stakeholder groups 
helped to ensure that all groups had a say, stayed engaged, encouraged consensus 
and helped to build trust across the different stakeholders.
Another element that can encourage the building of trust is the participation 
of a neutral facilitator who is trusted by different stakeholders, can bring them 
together, structures and manages the project, and facilitates discussions and helps 
to resolve differences – if possible before they rise to the level of real conflicts. 
From a practical standpoint, the facilitator can also serve as a point of contact 
and a centre of gravity for the initiative, from which communications about the 
work and progress of the initiative can be shared and disseminated. The website 
created by DCAF to provide information on the progress of the development 
of the ICOCA is one example of this. It helped to support better transparency, 
allowing anyone with an interest to keep up to date with the latest developments 
in the process.
To support more constructive meetings in which clear progress is made, it 
is helpful to set clear public objectives with milestones and approximate timelines. 
In contrast to the development of the ICOC, where milestones and timelines 
With a view to answering one of the questions posed at the beginning of this 
paper, how to develop more effective regulation for PSCs, a number of key 
lessons can be identified and are considered in more depth in this section. This 
analysis considers both elements of process, or what activities and approaches 
were undertaken to develop the standards and the governance framework of the 
ICOC initiative, and elements of substance, discussing how the results of these 
processes help to fill governance gaps.
Developing the ICOC initiative: Elements of process
In crafting an MSI in which diverse stakeholders with sometimes antithetical 
views participate, it is critically important that these actors have substantially 
similar overall objectives and vision for the initiative. This is not to say that the reasons 
why each stakeholder group participates need to be the same. All the different 
rationales for participating can be satisfied by the same result: improved human 
security. With this common “end-game result” desired by all participants, they 
are likely to be more flexible when grappling with details, to work together to find 
creative solutions and to believe in the good-faith intent of other stakeholders.
As a close corollary to the first point, building trust among all stakeholders is 
essential. Building trust between such disparate actors takes time and requires 
substantial work investments, as illustrated by the multiple meetings, workshops, 
Good Practices and  
Lessons Learned
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company on the manner in which it is operating, and should help to prevent 
larger, more damaging incidents from occurring. If the company does not 
participate in good faith in this dialogue and begin to rectify the non-compliance, 
this would kick off a process that could lead to the company’s membership being 
suspended or terminated, and potentially for it to lose business. This ambitious 
and complex function will likely take up the bulk of the ICOCA’s activities and 
resources. As the procedures for the function are currently under development, 
it is yet to be seen whether this non-state mechanism will be able to perform 
monitoring effectively such that it can achieve at least some of its aims. 
Along the same lines, the grievance mechanism should provide a means for 
injured parties to obtain effective remedies, particularly where other account-
ability mechanisms are ineffective or unavailable. While not able to prosecute 
personnel members or companies for criminal wrongdoing, such an approach at 
least should be able to provide some measure of relief and recompense to those 
negatively impacted by companies’ activities. Furthermore, the decentralized 
system whereby a company’s internal grievance mechanism serves as the 
regular venue of first instance, operating under the watchful eye of the ICOCA, 
provides a compromise that keeps costs lower while providing some assurance 
that aggrieved parties are treated fairly and get the remedies they deserve. At the 
same time, leaving the option open that they can approach the ICOCA directly in 
the first instance in certain situations,163 or as a kind of venue of appeal in cases 
where the company’s handling of the grievance did not meet the requirements of 
the code, offers the flexibility to adapt to different situations in order to fulfil the 
objectives of the grievance mechanism. Finally, this flexibility in handling and 
responding to grievances is necessary to ensure that the ICOCA is not negatively 
impacting or undermining effective investigations of abuses being carried out 
by governments, but can step in and provide a forum to hear grievances where 
government authorities are not conducting effective investigations. In fact, it is 
conceivable that having the international standards developed by the ICOC and 
the oversight mechanism of the ICOCA could even encourage more effective 
oversight and accountability by states, both by providing more clarity on the kinds 
of behaviours of PSCs that respect human rights standards and by offering a little 
“friendly competition” in terms of accountability mechanisms: the existence of a 
multistakeholder grievance mechanism available to step in when governments 
show reluctance to handle grievances effectively may exert some pressure on 
them to carry out their state responsibilities to protect victims and provide them 
with effective remedies.
were not publicly announced, the process to develop the ICOCA was much more 
structured and focused, helping to move the process in a forward direction. 
This more structured approach served to keep the TSC on track even as it was 
grappling with the significantly more challenging task of developing a multistake-
holder governance and oversight mechanism.  
Another strategy that helped to support progress was the development of small 
multistakeholder subgroups to work on specific tasks and challenges in between 
regular meetings. These groups, which at crucial times in the process invited 
subject-matter experts from the broader stakeholder communities to provide 
additional advice and guidance, helped both to advance the progress of the project 
and to obtain broader expertise, guidance and lessons learned from other similar 
processes. This helped to ensure that the ICOC initiative was able to benefit from 
the experience of other initiatives, which provided a basis from which the ICOC 
could evolve and develop further.
Developing the ICOC initiative: Elements of substance 
Turning to matters of substance, in terms of the governance functions of the 
ICOCA, certification is meant to provide snapshots at regular intervals in time 
that capture the extent to which companies have implemented due diligence 
requirements in their systems and policies. Essentially, companies will need to 
provide information on how they have transformed the principles and standards 
from the ICOC into practices within their company. This would include, for 
example, describing the methods they use for selection and vetting of personnel 
and the types and content of training they provide to them, as well as the procedures 
they have in place for handling grievances. Member PSCs should also provide 
evidence that they use practices respecting human rights to manage and support 
personnel, such as by taking reasonable precautions to provide them with a safe 
and healthy working environment, and implementing a zero-tolerance policy for 
harassment and abuse within the company. Ultimately, these practices are meant 
to filter into the way that companies operate and provide private security services, 
thereby significantly lowering the likelihood that their activities will negatively 
impact human rights.
Certification will be complemented by ongoing monitoring, consisting of 
processes that collect real-time information on companies’ operations in between 
the certification “snapshots”, with the objective of becoming a kind of “early 
warning system” to detect signs that a company is not operating in conformity 
with the code. A finding of non-conformity would trigger a dialogue with the 
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The need to develop and implement effective approaches to close governance 
gaps created by the global marketplace will continue to grow in importance as our 
world becomes more socially interconnected and economically interdependent. 
Identifying these gaps is an essential first step in being able to conceptualize and 
craft effective responses that can address real challenges to governance and account-
ability. This paper aims to present such a process undertaken in the context of the 
private security industry, first identifying governance gaps in public regulatory 
frameworks and then describing a multistakeholder response that endeavours to 
set international standards for the private security sector and address governance 
gaps in its oversight and regulation. The processes to develop both the ICOC 
and the ICOCA demonstrate that multistakeholder approaches involving relevant 
actors from both the public and private sectors can be successful in developing 
and setting international standards, as well as in crafting regulatory frameworks 
that make use of complementary public and private means of accountability and 
enforcement – thereby offering the potential to fill some governance gaps.
In considering the foregoing elements, it is important to view them in the 
context of the point of departure of this paper, namely why the private security 
industry has voluntarily submitted itself to regulation by an MSI. While it would 
not be incorrect to say that in embarking on this journey the private security 
industry was seeking legitimacy for its activities, the reasons for this lack of 
Finally, the growing number of governments and intergovernmental organizations 
encouraging or requiring membership in the ICOCA changes the nature of the 
multistakeholder approach to governance, shifting it from an initiative which 
relies largely on the willingness of companies to participate to one in which 
membership in good standing is a condition of entry into some markets and 
a condition of law in others. This “co-regulatory” approach allows the different 
relevant actors to exert influence and take decisions where they have the best 
expertise and the most leverage, bringing in both subject-matter knowledge and 
the concerns of the affected communities, as well as the availability of enforcement 
through obligations of contracts and as a matter of law. Taken together, these 
efforts are emblematic of an emerging consensus that effective governance of 
these kinds of private actors requires regulatory efforts by multiple actors – both 
public and private – often overlapping, but all largely harmonized in the standards 
they use. Perhaps most importantly, the ICOC initiative approaches human rights 
standards from the perspective of persons impacted by the activities of PSCs, 
or from a human security vantage point. In contrast to a state-centric national 
security approach in which abuses of the civilian population by either public 
or private actors may not trigger a response from the international community, 
the ICOC initiative holds the respect for human rights of the civilian population 
as the standard against which companies are assessed and held accountable, 
recognizing that respect for human rights concerns matters between state and 
state, citizen and state, and citizen and citizen.
Conclusion
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ard-setting part of regulation. The ICOCA takes regulation to another level by 
establishing a multistakeholder governance framework that requires companies 
to demonstrate they have implemented the ICOC in their management systems 
and policies, and to submit their activities to monitoring and to a process for 
handling grievances that includes providing effective remedies to those negatively 
impacted by their private security services. Finally, as more state and non-state 
clients contractually require the PSCs they hire to operate in compliance with the 
standards of the ICOC and to become members in good standing of the ICOCA, 
this adds another level to the regulatory matrix, helping to “harden” an essentially 
“soft law” approach.
Furthermore, in participating in this initiative, it is important to recognize 
the level of scrutiny to which the industry was subjected in the course of these 
processes. More accurately, the private security industry can be said to have 
submitted its activities and ways of doing business to an in-depth review by its 
peers, governments, clients and members of civil society – effectively asking 
the question what does the multistakeholder international community think is 
appropriate for the private security industry to provide, and according to what 
standards and within what limits? The answer paints a picture of private security 
activities that should be quite limited in scope and in use of force, and should 
not be involved in overthrowing governments or directly participating in armed 
conflict, but in so far as these services can positively contribute to public and 
human security in accordance with international humanitarian and human rights 
standards, they can be beneficial.
While at the time of this writing it is too early to say how successful the 
ICOCA will be in achieving its objective of promoting “the responsible provision 
of security services and respect for human rights and national and international 
law in accordance with the Code”, both the ICOC and ICOCA can already be 
said to have had important normative effects. Increasingly, the ICOC is seen as 
the benchmark against which other standards and regulatory efforts for private 
security are measured. With signatures by over 700 companies headquartered 
in 71 different states, the ICOC has achieved a high level of recognition and 
acceptance across the PSC industry. Furthermore, the principles and standards 
contained in the ICOC are currently being transformed into an ISO standard.164 
This document, like its ANSI precedent PSC.1, takes a QMS approach to the 
ICOC, setting out a framework to evaluate the extent to which the systems and 
policies of a PSC demonstrate compliance with the ICOC. So long as the future 
ISO standard faithfully reproduces and incorporates the principles and standards 
legitimacy were due not only to wrongdoing on the part of PSCs, but also to 
the failure of the international legal system composed of states to oversee PSCs 
and hold them accountable effectively. This also points to the trend of states 
increasingly outsourcing to private actors many activities that were traditionally 
understood to be the responsibility of the state, including security provision, and 
which are the subjects of multiple international agreements. In this complex, 
multifaceted and continuously evolving situation in which both public and 
private actors have influence and control, and where private actors are not directly 
regulated by international agreements, additional forms of regulation, oversight 
and governance are required. This was recognized by the PSC industry, and 
explains why it considered that an initiative to develop a code of conduct with 
effective governance was necessary.
This also helps to explain why government and civil society actors were 
invited to participate with PSCs in this endeavour: all these actors have a stake in 
the provision of private security, with governments in the role of both regulators 
and sometimes clients, civil society being directly impacted by PSC activities, and 
PSCs delivering these services. To ensure as far as possible that private security is 
provided in such a manner that activities on the ground respect international law 
and the rights of individuals, it needs the participation of all these actors. PSCs 
can offer a “reality check” on the services they are providing, including the actual 
challenges they face on the ground, and how to integrate international standards 
effectively into private security provision; civil society can provide information on 
how these services and activities are actually affecting people on the ground; and 
governments are able both to regulate PSCs at national and international levels 
and to include requirements in their laws and procurement practices. Non-state 
clients also have an important stake and the ability to impose requirements in 
their contractual agreements describing how the PSCs they hire must provide 
private security services. 
This also helps to answer the second question posed at the start of this paper, 
asking what form this regulation should and could take, and furthermore how 
it could be developed. Taking the two parts of this question in reverse order, as 
explained above, those actors with important relationships to and experience 
in private security provision had the expertise to contribute substantively to a 
consultative and iterative process that identified their challenges and needs, as 
well as good practices and positive experiences. This information was interpreted 
through the lens of well-established international human rights and IHL 
standards by legal scholars and experts, which resulted in the ICOC, or the stand-
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also speaks to the relatively nascent nature of these approaches, and the need to 
develop appropriate methodologies for analysing the effects and impacts of MSIs, 
particularly on the civilian populations they are aiming to protect.
Against this backdrop, it is suggested that additional work be undertaken 
along these lines to analyse the different approaches of existing MSIs. Specifically, 
further research of these initiatives is required to identify good practices, lessons 
learned and reliable indicators for implementation, with a view to developing 
more standardized frameworks for evaluating their impacts and effectiveness, 
and contributing to their improvement. In conducting this research, attention 
should also be paid to the quality of governance, specifically how to ensure as 
far as possible that the relevant and appropriate stakeholders are taking part and 
have an appropriate say and influence in the initiative so as to support “good 
governance” in the multistakeholder context. Even more importantly, this future 
research should consider the impacts of such initiatives as experienced by the 
civilian populations that these efforts are meant to protect. Finally, the recent 
trend of governments and intergovernmental organizations requiring ICOCA 
membership illustrates an interesting hybrid approach relying on both state 
regulation and the regulation and oversight capacities of the multistakeholder 
ICOCA as a means of filling some governance gaps, and may serve as model for 
more governments and organizations to emulate. Taken together, these recom-
mendations will help support the development and evolution of multistakeholder 
governance approaches to respond effectively to emerging governance challenges, 
while also helping to ensure that they will meet their human rights protection 
objectives. 
contained in the ICOC, its subsequent adoption will be another indicator of the 
standard-setting success of the ICOC. While the value of such standards in the 
absence of a fully functioning oversight and governance mechanism supporting 
and verifying implementation may seem questionable, setting a clear normative 
benchmark can have an effect of its own, giving clients leverage to demand higher 
standards from their service providers. 
Evidence that this is already happening can be found in the increasing 
number of government and intergovernmental clients that are referencing the 
ICOC and ICOCA in their procurement guidelines – even before the ICOCA 
has fully implemented its oversight functions. Such references can be seen as 
a vote of confidence for both the standards and the potential of a multistake-
holder governance framework as embodied in the ICOCA. Called by some in the 
business and human rights community “the next generation of multistakeholder 
initiatives”,165 the ICOCA is increasingly viewed as a model for other MSIs to 
emulate. 
A more interesting question is whether the multistakeholder governance 
model can lead to “good governance”; that is, to what extent does it result in a 
system that ensures both effectiveness and accountability within a framework of 
rule of law and respect for human rights? In light of the foregoing discussions, 
certain points are worth keeping in mind as this and other MSIs go forward. In 
particular, MSIs raise the question of who is a good and relevant stakeholder. 
The answer – transcribing rationales for democratic governance to the realities 
of a transnational global marketplace – seems to indicate something going 
beyond nationality, where “stakeholder citizens” are expected to have a particular 
expertise, background or stake as a requirement for influencing decisions that 
will ultimately impact them in a proximate way. How to ensure that all relevant 
stakeholder citizens are included in the appropriate MSI such that they are not 
disenfranchised and do actively participate, can appropriately influence and 
effectively control the sector, and are properly overseen supporting a kind of 
“stakeholder rule of law” are important questions that will require more complete 
answers as the number of MSIs increases.166
While this paper does present the case that multistakeholder approaches 
to governance can improve regulation of the private security sector, it does not 
present concrete evidence of the effectiveness of multistakeholder approaches 
to governance, e.g. proof of reduced instances of human rights abuses by 
PSCs. On one hand, this goes to the difficulties in obtaining reliable baseline 
information against which success or lack thereof can be compared. However, it 
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3. Building on these foundations, the Signatory Companies to this International 
Code of Conduct for Private Security Service Providers (the “Code”) endorse 
the principles of the Montreux Document and the aforementioned “Respect, 
Protect, Remedy” framework as they apply to PSCs. In so doing, the Signatory 
Companies commit to the responsible provision of Security Services so as to 
support the rule of law, respect the human rights of all persons, and protect the 
interests of their clients. 
4. The Signatory Companies affirm that they have a responsibility to respect the 
human rights of, and fulfil humanitarian responsibilities towards, all those 
affected by their business activities, including Personnel, Clients, suppliers, 
shareholders, and the population of the area in which services are provided. 
The Signatory Companies also recognize the importance of respecting the var-
ious cultures encountered in their work, as well as the individuals they come 
into contact with as a result of those activities. 
5. The purpose of this Code is to set forth a commonly-agreed set of principles 
for PSCs and to establish a foundation to translate those principles into 
related standards as well as governance and oversight mechanisms. 
6. Signatory Companies commit to the following, as set forth in this Code:
a) to operate in accordance with this Code; 
b) to operate in accordance with applicable laws and regulations, and in 
accordance with relevant corporate standards of business conduct;
c) to operate in a manner that recognizes and supports the rule of law; 
respects human rights, and protects the interests of their clients;
d) to take steps to establish and maintain an effective internal governance 
framework in order to deter, monitor, report, and effectively address 
adverse impacts on human rights;
e) to provide a means for responding to and resolving allegations of activity 
that violates any applicable national or international law or this Code; and
f) to cooperate in good faith with national and international authorities 
exercising proper jurisdiction, in particular with regard to national and 
international investigations of violations of national and international 
criminal law, of violations of international humanitarian law, or of human 
rights abuses.
A. Preamble
1. Private Security Companies and other Private Security Service Providers (col-
lectively “PSCs”) play an important role in protecting state and non-state cli-
ents engaged in relief, recovery, and reconstruction efforts, commercial busi-
ness operations, diplomacy and military activity. In providing these services, 
the activities of PSCs can have potentially positive and negative consequences 
for their clients, the local population in the area of operation, the general secu-
rity environment, the enjoyment of human rights and the rule of law.
2. The Montreux Document On Pertinent International Legal Obligations and Good 
Practices for States Related to Operations of Private Military and Security Compa-
nies During Armed Conflict recognizes that well-established rules of interna-
tional law apply to States in their relations with private security service pro-
viders and provides for good practices relating to PSCs. The “Respect, Protect, 
Remedy” framework developed by the Special Representative of the United Na-
tions (UN) Secretary-General on Business and Human Rights, and welcomed 
by the UN Human Rights Council, entails acting with due diligence to avoid 
infringing the rights of others.  
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B. Definitions
These definitions are only intended to apply exclusively in the context of this 
Code.
Auditing – a process through which independent auditors, accredited by the 
governance and oversight mechanism, conduct on-site audits, including in the 
field, on a periodic basis, gathering data to be reported to the governance and 
oversight mechanism which will in turn verify whether a Company is meeting 
requirements and if not, what remediation may be required.
Certification – a process through which the governance and oversight mechanism 
will certify that a Company’s systems and policies meet the Code’s principles 
and the standards derived from the Code and that a Company is undergoing 
Monitoring, Auditing, and verification, including in the field, by the governance 
and oversight mechanism. Certification is one element of a larger effort needed to 
ensure the credibility of any Implementation and oversight initiative. 
Client – an entity that hires, has formerly hired, or intends to hire a PSC to 
perform Security Services on its behalf, including, as appropriate, where such a 
PSC subcontracts with another Company.
Company – any kind of business entity or form, such as a sole proprietor-
ship, partnership, company (whether public or private), or corporation, and 
“Companies” shall be interpreted accordingly.
Competent Authority – any state or intergovernmental organization which has 
jurisdiction over the activities and/or persons in question and “Competent 
Authorities” shall be interpreted accordingly.
Complex Environments – any areas experiencing or recovering from unrest or 
instability, whether due to natural disasters or armed conflicts, where the rule 
of law has been substantially undermined, and in which the capacity of the state 
authority to handle the situation is diminished, limited, or non-existent.  
Implementation – the introduction of policy, governance and oversight 
mechanisms and training of Personnel and/or subcontractors by Signatory 
7. Those establishing this Code recognize that this Code acts as a founding 
instrument for a broader initiative to create better governance, compliance 
and accountability. Recognizing that further effort is necessary to implement 
effectively the principles of this Code, Signatory Companies accordingly 
commit to work with states, other Signatory Companies, Clients and other 
relevant stakeholders after initial endorsement of this Code to, within 18 
months:
a) Establish objective and measurable standards for providing Security 
Services based upon this Code, with the objective of realizing common and 
internationally-recognized operational and business practice standards; 
and
b) Establish external independent mechanisms for effective governance 
and oversight, which will include Certification of Signatory Companies’ 
compliance with the Code’s principles and the standards derived 
from the Code, beginning with adequate policies and procedures, 
Auditing and Monitoring of their work in the field, including 
Reporting, and execution of a mechanism to address alleged violations 






8. Signature of this Code is the first step in a process towards full compliance. 
Signatory Companies need to: (1) establish and/or demonstrate internal 
processes to meet the requirements of the Code’s principles and the standards 
derived from the Code; and (2) once the governance and oversight mechanism 
is established, become certified by and submit to ongoing independent 
Auditing and verification by that mechanism.   Signatory Companies 
undertake to be transparent regarding their progress towards implementing 
the Code’s principles and the standards derived from the Code.  Companies 
will not claim they are certified under this Code until Certification has been 
granted by the governance and oversight mechanism as outlined below.
and thereafter to consider the development of additional principles and 
standards for related services, such as training of external forces, the provision 
of maritime security services and the participation in operations related to 
detainees and other protected persons. 
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C. Implementation
9. In recognition of the additional steps to be taken to support the Imple-
mentation of this Code – in particular the development of standards based 
on the Code (“standards”) and an independent governance and oversight 
mechanism (“the mechanism”) as outlined in the Preamble – Signatory 
Companies intend to, along with other interested stakeholders, convene 
regularly to review progress toward those steps.
10. Upon signature of the Code, Signatory Companies and other stakeholders will 
undertake to work with national standards bodies as appropriate to develop 
standards, with the intent that any national standards would eventually be 
harmonized in an international set of standards based on the Code.
11. Upon signature of the Code, Signatory Companies and other stakeholders 
will appoint a multi-stakeholder steering committee of 6-9 members who 
will function as a “temporary board”. This steering committee will be 
responsible for developing and documenting the initial arrangements for 
the independent governance and oversight mechanism, including by-laws 
or a charter which will outline mandate and governing policies for the 
mechanism. The Steering Committee will endeavour to complete a work plan 
for constituting the mechanism before the end of March 2011, and further to 
develop the bylaws/charter by the end of July 2011 and an operational plan 
before the end of November 2011. 
12. After the independent governance and oversight mechanism has been 
constituted (by the adoption of bylaws/charter), the governance and oversight 
mechanism shall accept responsibility for maintenance and administration 
of the Code, and shall determine whether and how it is appropriate for the 
mechanism and standards to be reflected in the text of the Code itself.
Companies, necessary to demonstrate compliance with the Code’s principles and 
the standards derived from this Code. 
Monitoring – a process for gathering data on whether Company Personnel, 
or subcontractors, are operating in compliance with the Code’s principles and 
standards derived from this Code.
Personnel – persons working for a PSC, whether as employees or under a 
contract, including its staff, managers and directors. For the avoidance of doubt, 
persons are considered to be personnel if they are connected to a PSC through 
an employment contract (fixed term, permanent or open-ended) or a contract of 
assignment (whether renewable or not), or if they are independent contractors, 
or temporary workers and/or interns (whether paid or unpaid), regardless of the 
specific designation used by the Company concerned.
Private Security Companies and Private Security Service Providers (collectively 
“PSCs”) – any Company (as defined in this Code) whose business activities 
include the provision of Security Services either on its own behalf or on behalf of 
another, irrespective of how such Company describes itself.
Reporting – a process covered by necessary confidentiality and nondisclosure 
arrangements through which companies will submit to a governance and 
oversight mechanism a written assessment of their performance pursuant to a 
transparent set of criteria established by the mechanism.
Security Services – guarding and protection of persons and objects, such as 
convoys, facilities, designated sites, property or other places (whether armed 
or unarmed), or any other activity for which the Personnel of Companies are 
required to carry or operate a weapon in the performance of their duties.  
Signatory Companies – are PSCs that have signed and agreed to operate in 
compliance with the Code’s principles and the standards derived from the Code 
and “Signatory Company” shall be interpreted accordingly.
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Code, applicable national or international law, or applicable local, regional 
and international human rights law, and are not excused by any contractual 
obligation from complying with this Code. To the maximum extent possible, 
Signatory Companies will interpret and perform contracts in a manner that 
is consistent with this Code.
21. Signatory Companies will comply, and will require their Personnel to comply, 
with applicable law which may include international humanitarian law, and 
human rights law as imposed upon them by applicable national law, as well 
as all other applicable international and national law. Signatory Companies 
will exercise due diligence to ensure compliance with the law and with 
the principles contained in this Code, and will respect the human rights 
of persons they come into contact with, including, the rights to freedom 
of expression, association, and peaceful assembly and against arbitrary or 
unlawful interference with privacy or deprivation of property. 
22. Signatory Companies agree not to contract with, support or service any 
government, person, or entity in a manner that would be contrary to United 
Nations Security Council sanctions. Signatory Companies will not, and will 
require that their Personnel do not, participate in, encourage, or seek to benefit 
from any national or international crimes including but not limited to war 
crimes, crimes against humanity, genocide, torture, enforced disappearance, 
forced or compulsory labour, hostage-taking, sexual or gender-based violence, 
human trafficking, the trafficking of weapons or drugs, child labour or 
extrajudicial, summary or arbitrary executions. 
23. Signatory Companies will not, and will require that their Personnel do not, 
invoke contractual obligations, superior orders or exceptional circumstances 
such as an armed conflict or an imminent armed conflict, a threat to national 
or international security, internal political instability, or any other public 
emergency, as a justification for engaging in any of the conduct identified in 
paragraph 22 of this Code.
24. Signatory Companies will report, and will require their Personnel to report, 
known or reasonable suspicion of the commission of any of the acts identified 
in paragraph 22 of this Code to the Client and one or more of the following: 
D. General Provisions
13. This Code articulates principles applicable to the actions of Signatory 
Companies while performing Security Services in Complex Environments.
14. This Code complements and does not replace the control exercised by 
Competent Authorities, and does not limit or alter applicable international 
law or relevant national law. The Code itself creates no legal obligations and 
no legal liabilities on the Signatory Companies, beyond those which already 
exist under national or international law. Nothing in this Code shall be 
interpreted as limiting or prejudicing in any way existing or developing rules 
of international law.
15. This Code may be modified in accordance with procedures to be established 
by the governance and oversight mechanism.
E. General Commitments
16. Signatory Companies agree to operate in accordance with the principles 
contained in this Code. Signatory Companies will require that their Personnel, 
and all subcontractors or other parties carrying out Security Services under 
Signatory Company contracts, operate in accordance with the principles 
contained in this Code.
17. Signatory Companies will implement appropriate policies and oversight with 
the intent that the actions of their Personnel comply at all times with the 
principles contained herein. 
18. Signatory Companies will make compliance with this Code an integral part of 
contractual agreements with Personnel and subcontractors or other parties 
carrying out Security Services under their contracts.
19. Signatory Companies will adhere to this Code, even when the Code is not 
included in a contractual agreement with a Client. 
20. Signatory Companies will not knowingly enter into contracts where 
performance would directly and materially conflict with the principles of this 
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Use of Force
30. Signatory Companies will require their Personnel to take all reasonable steps 
to avoid the use of force. If force is used, it shall be in a manner consistent 
with applicable law. In no case shall the use of force exceed what is strictly 
necessary, and should be proportionate to the threat and appropriate to the 
situation.
31. Signatory Companies will require that their Personnel not use firearms 
against persons except in self-defence or defence of others against the 
imminent threat of death or serious injury, or to prevent the perpetration of 
a particularly serious crime involving grave threat to life.  
32. To the extent that Personnel are formally authorized to assist in the exercise 
of a state’s law enforcement authority, Signatory Companies will require that 
their use of force or weapons will comply with all national and international 
obligations applicable to regular law enforcement officials of that state and, 
as a minimum, with the standards expressed in the United Nations Basic 
Principles on the Use of Force and Firearms by Law Enforcement Officials 
(1990).
Detention
33. Signatory Companies will only, and will require their Personnel will only, 
guard, transport, or question  detainees if: (a) the Company has been 
specifically contracted to do so by a state; and (b) its Personnel are trained in 
the applicable national and international law. Signatory Companies will, and 
will require that their Personnel, treat all detained persons humanely and 
consistent with their status and protections under applicable human rights 
law or international humanitarian law, including in particular prohibitions 
on torture or other cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment.
Apprehending Persons
34. Signatory Companies will, and will require their Personnel to, not take or 
hold any persons except when apprehending persons to defend themselves or 
others against an imminent threat of violence, or following an attack or crime 
the Competent Authorities in the country where the act took place, the country 
of nationality of the victim, or the country of nationality of the perpetrator.
25. Signatory Companies will take reasonable steps to ensure that the goods and 
services they provide are not used to violate human rights law or international 
humanitarian law, and such goods and services are not derived from such 
violations.
26. Signatory Companies will not, and will require that their Personnel do not, 
consistent with applicable national and international law, promise, offer, or 
give to any public official, directly or indirectly, anything of value for the public 
official himself or herself or another person or entity, in order that the public 
official act or refrain from acting in the exercise of his or her official duties if 
such inducement is illegal.  Signatory Companies will not, and will require 
their Personnel do not, solicit or accept, directly or indirectly, anything of 
value in exchange for not complying with national and international law and/
or standards, or with the principles contained within this Code.
27. Signatory Companies are responsible for establishing a corporate culture 
that promotes awareness of and adherence by all Personnel to the principles 
of this Code. Signatory Companies will require their Personnel to comply 
with this Code, which will include providing sufficient training to ensure 
Personnel are capable of doing so.
F. Specific Principles Regarding the Conduct of Personnel
General Conduct 
28. Signatory Companies will, and will require their Personnel to, treat all 
persons humanely and with respect for their dignity and privacy and will 
report any breach of this Code. 
 
Rules for the Use of Force
29. Signatory Companies will adopt Rules for the Use of Force consistent with 
applicable law and the minimum requirements contained in the section on 
Use of Force in this Code and agree those rules with the Client.
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Sexual Exploitation and Abuse or Gender-Based Violence
38. Signatory Companies will not benefit from, nor allow their Personnel to 
engage in or benefit from, sexual exploitation (including, for these purposes, 
prostitution) and abuse or gender-based violence or crimes, either within 
the Company or externally, including rape, sexual harassment, or any other 
form of sexual abuse or violence.  Signatory Companies will, and will require 
their Personnel to, remain vigilant for all instances of sexual or gender-based 
violence and, where discovered, report such instances to competent authorities.
Human Trafficking 
39. Signatory Companies will not, and will require their Personnel not to, engage 
in trafficking in persons. Signatory Companies will, and will require their 
Personnel to, remain vigilant for all instances of trafficking in persons and, 
where discovered, report such instances to Competent Authorities. For the 
purposes of this Code, human trafficking is the recruitment, harbouring, 
transportation, provision, or obtaining of a person for (1) a commercial sex 
act induced by force, fraud, or coercion, or in which the person induced to 
perform such an act has not attained 18 years of age; or (2) labour or services, 
through the use of force, fraud, or coercion for the purpose of subjection to 
involuntary servitude, debt bondage, or slavery.
Prohibition of Slavery and Forced Labour
40. Signatory Companies will not use slavery, forced or compulsory labour, or be 
complicit in any other entity’s use of such labour.
 
Prohibition on the Worst Forms of Child Labour
41. Signatory Companies will respect the rights of children (anyone under the 
age of 18) to be protected from the worst forms of child labour, including:
a) all forms of slavery or practices similar to slavery, such as the sale and 
trafficking of children, debt bondage and serfdom and forced or compulsory 
labour, including forced or compulsory recruitment of children for use in 
provision of armed services;
committed by such persons against Company Personnel, or against clients 
or property under their protection, pending the handover of such detained 
persons to the Competent Authority at the earliest opportunity.   Any such 
apprehension must be consistent with applicable national or international 
law and be reported to the Client without delay. Signatory Companies will, 
and will require that their Personnel to, treat all apprehended persons 
humanely and consistent with their status and protections under applicable 
human rights law or international humanitarian law, including in particular 
prohibitions on torture or other cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or 
punishment. 
Prohibition of Torture or Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or 
Punishment
35. Signatory Companies will not, and will require that their Personnel not, 
engage in torture or other cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or 
punishment. For the avoidance of doubt, torture and other cruel, inhuman 
or degrading treatment or punishment, as referred to here, includes conduct 
by a private entity which would constitute torture or other cruel, inhuman or 
degrading treatment or punishment if committed by a public official.
36. Contractual obligations, superior orders or exceptional circumstances such 
as an armed conflict or an imminent armed conflict, a threat to national 
or international security, internal political instability, or any other public 
emergency, can never be a justification for engaging in torture or other cruel, 
inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment.
37. Signatory Companies will, and will require that their Personnel, report any 
acts of torture or other cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment, 
known to them, or of which they have reasonable suspicion. Such reports 
will be made to the Client and one or more of the following: the competent 
authorities in the country where the acts took place, the country of nationality 
of the victim, or the country of nationality of the perpetrator.
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G. Specific Commitments Regarding Management and Governance
 
Incorporation of the Code into Company Policies
44. Signatory Companies will incorporate this Code into Company policies and 
internal control and compliance systems and integrate it into all relevant 
elements of their operations.  
 
Selection and Vetting of Personnel
45. Signatory Companies will exercise due diligence in the selection of Personnel, 
including verifiable vetting and ongoing performance review of their 
Personnel.  Signatory Companies will only hire individuals with the requisite 
qualifications as defined by the applicable contract, applicable national law 
and industry standards, and the principles contained in this Code.
46. Signatory Companies will not hire individuals under the age of 18 years to 
carry out Security Services.
47. Signatory Companies will assess and ensure the continued ability of Personnel 
to perform their duties in accordance with the principles of this Code and will 
regularly evaluate Personnel to ensure that they meet appropriate physical 
and mental fitness standards to perform their contracted duties.
48. Signatory Companies will establish and maintain internal policies and 
procedures to determine the suitability of applicants, or Personnel, to carry 
weapons as part of their duties. At a minimum, this will include checks that 
they have not:  
a) been convicted of a crime that would indicate that the individual lacks 
the character and fitness to perform security services pursuant to the 
principles of this Code; 
b) been dishonourably discharged;
c) had other employment or engagement contracts terminated for 
documented violations of one or more of the principles contained in this 
Code; or
b) the use, procuring or offering of a child for prostitution, for the production 
of pornography or for pornographic performances;
c) the use, procuring or offering of a child for illicit activities, in particular 
for the production and trafficking of drugs;
d) work which, by its nature or the circumstances in which it is carried out, 
is likely to harm the health, safety or morals of children.
     Signatory Companies will, and will require their Personnel to, report any 
instances of the activities referenced above that they know of, or have 
reasonable suspicion of, to Competent Authorities.
 
Discrimination
42. Signatory Companies will not, and will require that their Personnel do not, 
discriminate on grounds of race, colour, sex, religion, social origin, social 
status, indigenous status, disability, or sexual orientation when hiring 
Personnel and will select Personnel on the basis of the inherent requirements 
of the contract. 
 
Identification and Registering
43. Signatory Companies, to the extent consistent with reasonable security 
requirements and the safety of civilians, their Personnel and Clients, will:
a) require all Personnel to be individually identifiable whenever they are 
carrying out activities in discharge of their contractual responsibilities;
b) ensure that their vehicles are registered and licensed with the relevant 
national authorities whenever they are carrying out activities in discharge of 
their contractual responsibilities; and
c) will ensure that all hazardous materials are registered and licensed with the 
relevant national authorities.
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Company Policies and Personnel Contracts
52. Signatory Companies will ensure that their policies on the nature and scope 
of services they provide, on hiring of Personnel and other relevant Personnel 
reference materials such as Personnel contracts include appropriate 
incorporation of this Code and relevant and applicable labour laws.  Contract 
terms and conditions will be clearly communicated and available in a written 
form to all Personnel in a format and language that is accessible to them. 
53. Signatory Companies will keep employment and service records and reports 
on all past and present personnel for a period of 7 (seven) years. Signatory 
Companies will require all Personnel to authorize the access to, and retention 
of, employment records and available Government records, except where 
prohibited by law. Such records will be made available to any compliance 
mechanism established pursuant to this Code or Competent Authority on 
request, except where prohibited by law.
54. Signatory Companies will only hold passports, other travel documents, or 
other identification documents of their Personnel for the shortest period of 
time reasonable for administrative processing or other legitimate purposes. 
This paragraph does not prevent a Company from co-operating with law 
enforcement authorities in the event that a member of their Personnel is 
under investigation.
Training of Personnel
55. Signatory Companies will ensure that all Personnel performing Security 
Services receive initial and recurrent professional training and are also fully 
aware of this Code and all applicable international and relevant national 
laws, including those pertaining to international human rights, international 
humanitarian law, international criminal law and other relevant criminal 
law. Signatory Companies will maintain records adequate to demonstrate 
attendance and results from all professional training sessions, including 
from practical exercises.
d) had a history of other conduct that, according to an objectively reasonable 
standard, brings into question their fitness to carry a weapon.  
         For the purposes of this paragraph, disqualifying crimes may include, but are 
not limited to, battery, murder, arson, fraud, rape, sexual abuse, organized 
crime, bribery, corruption, perjury, torture, kidnapping, drug trafficking or 
trafficking in persons. This provision shall not override any law restricting 
whether a crime may be considered in evaluating an applicant. Nothing in 
this section would prohibit a Company from utilizing more stringent criteria.
49. Signatory Companies will require all applicants to authorize access to prior 
employment records and available Government records as a condition for 
employment or engagement. This includes records relating to posts held 
with the military, police or public or Private Security Providers. Moreover, 
Signatory Companies will, consistent with applicable national law, require all 
Personnel to agree to participate in internal investigations and disciplinary 
procedures as well as in any public investigations conducted by competent 
authorities, except where prohibited by law.
Selection and Vetting of Subcontractors
50. Signatory Companies will exercise due diligence in the selection, vetting 
and ongoing performance review of all subcontractors performing Security 
Services. 
51. In accordance with principle 13 of this Code, Signatory Companies will 
require that their Personnel and all subcontractors and other parties carrying 
out Security Services under the contract, operate in accordance with the 
principles contained in this Code and the standards derived from the Code. 
If a Company contracts with an individual or any other group or entity to 
perform Security Services, and that individual or group is not able to fulfil 
the selection, vetting and training principles contained in this Code and 
the standards derived from the Code, the contracting Company will take 
reasonable and appropriate steps to ensure that all selection, vetting and 
training of subcontractor’s Personnel is conducted in accordance with the 
principles contained in this Code and the standards derived from the Code.
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this Code and the UN Basic Principles on the Use of Force and Firearms by 
Law Enforcement Officials (1990), and national laws or regulations in effect 
in the area duties will be performed.
Management of Materiel of War
60. Signatory Companies will, and will require that their Personnel to, acquire 
and maintain all authorizations for the possession and use of any materiel of 
war, e.g. hazardous materials and munitions, as required by applicable law.
61. Signatory Companies will neither, and will require that their Personnel will 
neither, possess nor use any materiel of war, e.g. hazardous materials and 
munitions, which are illegal under any applicable law. Signatory Companies 
will not, and will require that their Personnel not engage in any illegal material 
transfers and will conduct any materiel of war transactions in accordance with 
applicable laws and UN Security Council requirements, including sanctions.
62. Signatory Company policies or procedures for management of materiel of 
war, e.g. hazardous materials and munitions, should include:
a) secure storage;
b) controls over their issue;
c) records regarding to whom and when materials are issued; and
d) proper disposal procedures.
Incident Reporting
63. Signatory Companies will prepare an incident report documenting any 
incident involving its Personnel that involves the use of any weapon, which 
includes the firing of weapons under any circumstance (except authorized 
training), any escalation of force, damage to equipment or injury to persons, 
attacks, criminal acts, traffic accidents, incidents involving other security 
forces, or such reporting as otherwise required by the Client, and will conduct 
an internal inquiry in order to determine the following:
Management of Weapons
56. Signatory Companies will acquire and maintain authorizations for the 
possession and use of any weapons and ammunition required by applicable 
law. 
57. Signatory Companies will neither, and will require that their Personnel do 
not, possess nor use weapons or ammunition which are illegal under any 
applicable law.   Signatory Companies will not, and will require that their 
Personnel not, engage in any illegal weapons transfers and will conduct any 
weapons transactions in accordance with applicable laws and UN Security 
Council requirements, including sanctions.  Weapons and ammunition will 
not be altered in any way that contravenes applicable national or international 
law.
58. Signatory Company policies or procedures for management of weapons and 
ammunitions should include:
a) secure storage;
b) controls over their issue;
c) records regarding to whom and when weapons are issued;
d) identification and accounting of all ammunition; and
e) verifiable and proper disposal.
Weapons Training
59. Signatory Companies will require that: 
a) Personnel who are to carry weapons will be granted authorization to do so 
only on completion or verification of appropriate training with regard to the 
type and model of weapon they will carry.   Personnel will not operate with 
a weapon until they have successfully completed weapon-specific training.
b) Personnel carrying weapons must receive regular, verifiable and recurrent 
training specific to the weapons they carry and rules for the use of force.
c) Personnel carrying weapons must receive appropriate training in regard to 
rules on the use of force. This training may be based on a variety of relevant 
standards, but should be based at a minimum on the principles contained in 
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Grievance Procedures
66. Signatory Companies will establish grievance procedures to address claims 
alleging failure by the Company to respect the principles contained in this 
Code brought by Personnel or by third parties.
67. Signatory Companies will:
a) establish procedures for their Personnel and for third parties to report 
allegations of improper and/or illegal conduct to designated Personnel, 
including such acts or omissions that would violate the principles contained 
in this Code. Procedures must be fair, accessible and offer effective remedies, 
including recommendations for the prevention of recurrence. They shall 
also facilitate reporting by persons with reason to believe that improper or 
illegal conduct, or a violation of this Code, has occurred or is about to occur, 
of such conduct, to designated individuals within a Company and, where 
appropriate, to competent authorities;
b) publish details of their grievance mechanism on a publically accessible 
website;
c) investigate allegations promptly, impartially and with due consideration to 
confidentiality;
d) keep records about any such allegations, findings or disciplinary measures.  
Except where prohibited or protected by applicable law, such records should 
be made available to a Competent Authority on request;
e) cooperate with official investigations, and not participate in or tolerate from 
their Personnel, the impeding of witnesses, testimony or investigations;
f ) take appropriate disciplinary action, which could include termination of 
employment in case of a finding of such violations or unlawful behaviour; 
and
g) ensure that their Personnel who report wrongdoings in good faith are 
provided protection against any retaliation for making such reports, such as 
shielding them from unwarranted or otherwise inappropriate disciplinary 
measures, and that matters raised are examined and acted upon without 
undue delay.  
a) time and location of the incident;
b) identity and nationality of any persons involved including their addresses 
and other contact details;
c) injuries/damage sustained;
d) circumstances leading up to the incident; and
e) any measures taken by the Signatory Company in response to it.
Upon completion of the inquiry, the Signatory Company will produce in 
writing an incident report including the above information, copies of which 
will be provided to the Client and, to the extent required by law, to the 
Competent Authorities.
Safe and Healthy Working Environment
64. Signatory Companies will strive to provide a safe and healthy working 
environment, recognizing the possible inherent dangers and limitations 
presented by the local environment. Signatory Companies will ensure that 
reasonable precautions are taken to protect relevant staff in high-risk or 
life-threatening operations.  These will include:
a) assessing risks of injury to Personnel as well as the risks to the local 
population generated by the activities of Signatory Companies and/or 
Personnel;
b) providing hostile environment training;
c) providing adequate protective equipment, appropriate weapons and 
ammunition, and medical support; and
d) adopting policies which support a safe and healthy working environment 
within the Company, such as policies which address psychological health, 
deter work-place violence, misconduct, alcohol and drug abuse, sexual 
harassment and other improper behaviour.
Harassment
65. Signatory Companies will not tolerate harassment and abuse of co-workers 
by their Personnel.
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Article 1: Name and Registered Office 
1.1  The International Code of Conduct for Private Security Service Providers’ 
Association (alternatively known as the Association) is a multi-stake-
holder initiative established as a non-profit Association in accordance 
with Articles 60 et. seq. of the Swiss Civil Code and with these Articles of 
Association.   This Association is an independent legal entity with legal 
capacity governed by Swiss law.  Its duration is unlimited.
1.2  The Association has its seat in the Canton of Geneva.
1.3  The official language of the Association is English. 
Article 2: Purpose 
2.1  The Association has no profit motive.
2.2  The purpose (“Purpose”) of the Association is to promote, govern and 
oversee implementation of the International Code of Conduct for Private 
Security Service Providers (hereinafter “ICoC” or “Code”) and to promote 
68. No provision in this Code should be interpreted as replacing any contractual 
requirements or specific Company policies or procedures for reporting 
wrongdoing.
Meeting Liabilities 
69. Signatory Companies will ensure that they have sufficient financial capacity 
in place at all times to meet reasonably anticipated commercial liabilities 
for damages to any person in respect of personal injury, death or damage to 
property. Sufficient financial capacity may be met by customer commitments, 
adequate insurance coverage, (such as by employer’s liability and public 
liability coverage appropriately sized for the scale and scope of operations 
of the Signatory Company) or self insurance/retention. Where it is not 
possible to obtain suitable insurance cover, the Signatory Company will make 
alternative arrangements to ensure that it is able to meet such liabilities.
H. Review
70. The Swiss Government will maintain a public list of Signatory Companies 
and convene an initial review conference with a view to reviewing the Code 
after governance and oversight mechanisms (as referenced in the Preamble 
and Section C “Implementation” to this Code) are developed.
Annex: 
International Code of 
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Montreux Document and the Code, including the development of their 
domestic regulatory framework for PSC activities, and to promote 
compliance with the ICoC in their contracting practices and policies.
3.3.3  Civil society Members shall be independent, non-profit organizations with 
a demonstrated institutional record at the local, national, or international 
level of the promotion and protection of human rights, international 
humanitarian law or the rule of law.   Independence shall be assessed 
by reference to relationships with other stakeholder pillars, such as 
via specific, relevant or substantial funding, or through active working 
relationships.  Civil society Members commit to promote the Purpose of 
the Association.
3.4  In addition to the Member categories described above, the Board shall 
adopt procedures for approval by the General Assembly in accordance 
with these Articles to grant non-voting observer status to other parties, 
including non-state clients, companies providing services or other support 
to PSCs, and other stakeholders who have demonstrated support for the 
principles of the ICoC and the Purpose of the Association.
Article 4: Liability 
4.1  The Association’s financial obligations shall be satisfied only from its 
assets.  Members of the Association shall not be personally liable for any 
acts, omissions, obligations or debts of the Association.  The Association 
shall adopt appropriate procedures to address the indemnification of 
Members of the Board of Directors, Secretariat and the Executive Director.
Article 5: Association Bodies 
5.1  The bodies of the Association are: the General Assembly; the Board of 
Directors; the Secretariat operating under the supervision of an Executive 
Director; and such other bodies that may be established pursuant to these 
Articles. 
the responsible provision of security services and respect for human 
rights and national and international law in accordance with the Code.
2.3  The Association may engage in all activities and take all actions necessary 
and appropriate to carry out this purpose in accordance with these Articles.
Article 3: Membership 
3.1  Membership in the Association shall be divided into three membership 
categories reflecting stakeholder pillars: the Private Security Companies 
and Private Security Service Providers (collectively “PSCs”) pillar 
(hereinafter PSC pillar), the civil society organization (CSO) pillar, and 
the government pillar.
3.2  Within six (6) months of adoption of these Articles, the Board shall 
propose for approval by the General Assembly membership requirements 
for each of the three stakeholder pillars.
3.3  In determining membership requirements for each stakeholder pillar, the 
Board shall observe the following:
3.3.1  PSCs shall be eligible for membership upon certification under Article 11 of 
these Articles.  As a transitional matter, companies that formally endorse 
these Articles, and meet the obligations of membership, shall enjoy on 
a provisional basis the rights of membership prior to certification under 
Article 11 until one year following the approval of certification procedures 
under Article 11.
3.3.2  States and intergovernmental organizations that have communicated their 
support of the Montreux Document and who communicate their intent 
to support the principles of the ICoC and participate in the activities of 
the Association as specified in these Articles are eligible for membership.  
States and intergovernmental organizations may indicate on becoming a 
Member where legal requirements may prevent them from undertaking 
a specified organizational responsibility set forth in these Articles.   In 
becoming a Member, such States and intergovernmental organizations 
commit to provide information related to their implementation of the 
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6.4.8  Complaints Process Procedures.
6.5  Each Member shall have one vote on matters before the General Assembly.  
Ratification of amendments to the ICoC or to these Articles of Associations 
shall require a vote of not less than two-thirds of the Members present 
and eligible to vote in each of the three stakeholder pillars.  Election and 
dismissal of a Board Director shall require a majority vote of Members 
present and eligible to vote; only Members from a given stakeholder pillar 
shall be eligible to vote on election and dismissal of a Board Director 
representing that pillar.  All other decisions taken pursuant to this Article 
shall require a vote of the majority of the Members present and eligible to 
vote in each of the three stakeholder pillars.
6.6  The chair of the Board shall chair proceedings of the General Assembly 
and shall propose rules of procedure, including proxy voting and virtual 
meeting procedures, for the conduct of the General Assembly.
6.7  Powers not specified in these Articles shall be reserved to the Board of 
Directors.
6.8  A quorum for proceedings of the General Assembly shall be established 
by the participation in the meeting of at least twenty-five percent of the 
Members in each of the three stakeholder pillars.   Proceedings of the 
General Assembly may not be convened at less than thirty (30) days’ 
notice.
Article 7: Board of Directors 
7.1  The Board of Directors (alternatively “the Board”) is the executive deci-
sion-making body of the Association.  The Board manages the affairs of 
the association in accordance with the provisions of these Articles.  In so 
doing it seeks to represent the interests of the Association Members as a 
whole.
7.2  The Board shall be composed of twelve Directors, with four seats allocated 
to each of the stakeholder pillars.  Each Board Director shall be committed 
to the Purpose of the Association and shall fairly represent the views of 
Article 6: General Assembly 
6.1  The General Assembly is the supreme governing body of the Association 
and consists of a gathering of the full membership and shall take place 
at such times as may be determined by the Board of Directors, or by the 
request of at least 20 percent of the membership, but in no case shall 
meet less than once a year.
6.2  The General Assembly shall provide a forum for voting on matters as 
required under these Articles and for multi-stakeholder dialogue and 
discussion related to the ICoC and shall consider such agenda items as 
may be provided by the Board of Directors or, with the approval of the 
Board of Directors, proposed by the membership.
6.3  The General Assembly supervises the Association’s other corporate 
bodies.   The right of supervision includes the right to dismiss other 
corporate bodies at any time.    
6.4  The General Assembly shall also have the power to approve decisions by 
the Board of Directors in the following areas before such decisions will 
enter into force:
6.4.1  Amendments to the Code;
6.4.2  Amendments to these Articles of Association; 
6.4.3  Requirements for membership and observer status in the Association as 
well as withdrawal from the Association;
6.4.4  Establishment of membership dues;
6.4.5  Review and approval of financial statements, including external audits;
6.4.6  Certification Procedures;
6.4.7  Reporting, Monitoring and Assessing Performance Procedures;
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appropriate measures for Board Members in the event of a conflict of 
interest.
7.8  Board Directors shall act on an unpaid basis and be entitled only to the 
compensation of their effective costs and travelling expenses.  
Article 8: Powers of the Board of Directors 
8.1  The Board has authority and responsibility to:
8.1.1  Oversee the operations of the Secretariat, including through preparation, 
review and approval of an annual budget, and by approving staffing levels 
and staffing rules;
8.1.2  Provide an annual report on the activities of the Association and the 
implementation of the ICoC to the General Assembly;
8.1.3  Make recommendations to the General Assembly, including any recom-
mendations for the amendment of the ICoC or these Articles in accordance 
with these Articles;
8.1.4    Develop procedures, for approval by the General Assembly, for the functions 
of the Association under Articles 11, 12 and 13;
8.1.5  Develop requirements for Association membership and observer status 
and withdrawal in accordance with these Articles including measures, 
which shall be separately approved by the General Assembly, for 
suspension, termination or other such activities;
8.1.6  Oversee the finances of the Association, including the adoption of 
appropriate financial controls, arrangements for external audits, and 
the preparation of appropriate financial statements in accordance with 
applicable law;
8.1.7  Recommend membership dues for approval by the General Assembly in 
accordance with these Articles; and
the stakeholder pillar he or she represents.   Board Directors shall be 
selected in accordance with the requirements set forth in this Article and 
under nomination procedures to be established by each stakeholder pillar.  
Directors shall be selected with regard for the need for a high level of 
competency, commitment to participation, and diversity of experiences, 
insights and perspectives related to the Purpose of the Association.  The 
Board shall maintain a record of the nomination procedures adopted by 
each stakeholder pillar.  Election and dismissal of Board Directors shall be 
approved by the General Assembly in accordance with Article 6.5.
7.3  Except as otherwise provided for the initial Board in the Instrument of 
Adoption of these Articles, Board Directors shall serve three year terms. 
The Board shall provide for the staggered re-election of Board Directors 
as their terms expire and for the replacement of Board Directors when 
vacancies occur.   No Board Director shall serve for more than two 
consecutive terms.
7.4  The Board may select a Chairperson from among its membership or select 
an additional non-voting Independent Chairperson.  The Chairperson is 
responsible for convening and chairing Board meetings and otherwise 
managing the Board’s business.   The Chairperson’s term shall be 
established upon selection, but in no case shall exceed three years or, in 
the case of a Board Member with less than three years remaining in his or 
her term, the remainder of the term. 
7.5  The Board shall meet as necessary, but at least annually, in person or by 
other means as the Board may determine as necessary to implement its 
responsibilities under these Articles.
7.6  Unless otherwise provided by these Articles, decisions of the Board shall 
be taken by a majority of eight Board Directors, which must include 
a minimum of two votes from Board Directors from each of the three 
stakeholder pillars.
7.7  The Board shall adopt its own rules of procedure to, among other things, 
address the confidentiality obligations of Board Members, identify and 
disclose potential conflicts of interest and provide for recusal or other 
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Article 11: Certification 
11.1  The Association shall be responsible for certifying under the Code that 
a company’s systems and policies meet the Code’s principles and the 
standards derived from the Code and that a company is undergoing 
monitoring, auditing, and verification, including in the field.
11.2  The Board shall develop procedures for this Article based on the following 
elements and submit them to the General Assembly for approval:
11.2.1  The Board shall define the certification requirements based on national 
or international standards and processes that are recognized by the Board 
as consistent with the Code and specifying any additional information 
relevant to the human rights and humanitarian impact of operations it 
deems necessary for assessing whether a company’s systems and policies 
meet the requirements of the Code and its readiness to participate in the 
Association;
11.2.2  Companies shall provide evidence of certification under a standard 
recognized by the Board and keep this certification current, and provide 
such additional information as the Board has specified under Article 11.2.1;
11.2.3  Companies shall provide a written, public declaration of their intent to 
adhere to the Code with such language as the Board may prescribe, and to 
participate fully in the Association’s activities under Articles 12 and 13; and
11.2.4  The certification process shall operate in a manner that is complementary 
to, and not duplicative of, certification under Board-recognized national 
and international standards.
11.3  Certification by the Association shall remain valid for a period of three 
years.
11.4  The Association shall foster and promote the development and 
harmonization of standards in accordance with the Code, and maintain a 
registry of companies certified in accordance with this Article.
8.1.8  Establish such other committees or bodies, including an Advisory 
Board, as may be necessary to provide for the effective operation of the 
Association.
8.2  In exercising its responsibilities the Board will have due regard to the 
essential nature of any activity and applicable law, the budget and available 
resources, and the risks associated with the activity. 
Article 9: Executive Director and Secretariat 
9.1  The Executive Director shall be appointed by the Board and shall execute 
the decisions of the Board and otherwise direct the activities and admin-
istration of the Association and Secretariat subject to the authority of the 
Board and in accordance with these Articles.
9.2  Subject to Article 8.1.1, the Executive Director shall hire and supervise 
such staff as may be required to carry out the activities of the Association 
as prescribed by these Articles.
9.3  The Secretariat shall be responsible for maintaining records necessary 
for the ongoing governance of the Association (“The Archive”) that shall 
include, but is not limited to:  a) rules; b) bylaws; c) records of votes; and 
d) any other records of governance.
Article 10: Advisory Forum of Montreux Document Participants 
10.1  An Advisory Forum of Montreux Document Participants shall be 
established.   The Forum will be open to all Montreux Document 
Participants irrespective of their membership status in the Association 
and will be available as a resource to the Board.  The purpose of this body 
is to provide advice to the Association on national and international policy 
and regulatory matters. 
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12.2.6  The Board shall review performance and compliance issues referred 
by the Executive Director or at its own initiative.  The Board shall offer 
observations and advice to Member companies aimed at improving 
performance or addressing specific compliance concerns.
12.2.7  If the Board determines that corrective action is required to remedy 
non-compliance with the Code, the Board shall request a Member 
company take corrective action within a specific time period.   Should 
a Member company fail to take reasonable corrective action within the 
period specified by the Board, or fail to act in good faith in accordance 
with these Articles, then the Board shall initiate suspension proceedings 
in accordance with these Articles. 
12.2.8  Member companies shall be expected to co-operate in good faith, 
consistent with applicable contractual and legal requirements.
12.2.9  The Board shall implement necessary confidentiality and nondisclosure 
arrangements related to its activities under this Article.  Subject to these 
arrangements and following consultations with relevant parties, the Board 
may issue a public statement on the status or outcome of the Association’s 
review of a Member company.
12.2.10  The Board shall ensure that the Association appropriately respects legal 
investigations or proceedings and any rights or privileges attached to 
those investigations or proceedings in carrying out the functions of this 
Article, but the presence of a legal investigation or proceeding will not 
necessarily of itself cause suspension of the functions of this Article.
12.3  The Association will report publicly, no less than annually, on its activities 
under this article.
12.4  The Association shall serve as a central agency for, and will promote 
industry best practices on, particular elements of the Code that will be 
available to companies. 
Article 12: Reporting, Monitoring and Assessing Performance 
12.1  The Association shall be responsible for exercising oversight of Member 
companies’ performance under the Code, including through external 
monitoring, reporting and a process to address alleged violations of the 
code.
12.2  The Board shall develop procedures for this Article based on the following 
elements and submit them to the General Assembly for approval:
12.2.1  Using established human rights methodologies, the Secretariat shall 
gather and receive information from public and other available sources on 
whether Member companies are operating in compliance with the Code.
12.2.2  Member companies shall provide to the Association a written assessment 
of their performance pursuant to a transparent set of criteria covered by 
necessary confidentiality and nondisclosure arrangements.
12.2.3  The Executive Director may initiate a field based review, unless the Board 
decides otherwise, (i) where the review of available information or a 
human rights risk assessment has identified a need for further monitoring 
within an area of one or more Member companies’ operations, or (ii) on 
request from a Member of the Association.  In each case such field base 
review shall be aimed at improving performance or addressing specific 
compliance concerns.
12.2.4  The Secretariat shall review information gathered pursuant to Articles 
12.2.1-12.2.3 to identify compliance concerns, assess the human rights 
impacts of company operations, and identify and analyze broader patterns 
in particular complex environments.
12.2.5  The Secretariat shall offer observations and engage in dialogue with 
Member companies aimed at improving performance or addressing 
specific compliance concerns.  The Executive Director shall refer alleged 
violations of the Code to the Board.  The Executive Director shall report 
regularly to the Board on the Secretariat’s activities pursuant to this 
Article.
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corrective action, including the suitability of the complaint being referred 
to another, identified fair and accessible grievance procedure that may 
offer an effective remedy.
13.2.5  After receiving the observations of the Secretariat, the Board may 
suggest that the complaint be referred to another, identified fair and 
accessible grievance procedure that may offer an effective remedy, and/
or recommend that the Member company take corrective action within 
a specified period. This may include cooperation with the Association’s 
good offices, the provision of a neutral and confidential mediation process, 
or other arrangements that may assist the Member company to offer an 
effective remedy as required by paragraphs 66 and 67 of the Code.  The 
Association shall not impose a specific award on the parties.
13.2.6  If, after further consultation with the complainant and Member company, 
the Board considers that the Member company has taken reasonable 
corrective action or the parties have referred the claim to a fair and 
accessible grievance procedure that may offer an effective remedy, it may 
determine that the complaint has been addressed.
13.2.7  Member companies shall be expected to cooperate in good faith, 
consistent with applicable law and contractual requirements.   If, after 
further consultation with the complainant and the Member company, the 
Board considers that the Member company has failed to take reasonable 
corrective action within a specified period or cooperate in good faith 
in accordance with this Article, it shall take action, which may include 
suspension or termination of membership.
13.2.8  Member companies shall provide, in good faith, to the Association 
information relevant to the complaint, consistent with applicable law and 
contractual requirements.
13.2.9  The Association shall discharge its function under this Article in a timely 
manner and respect the confidentiality of the complainant, Member 
companies, and other stakeholders, and, where relevant, consider the 
complainant’s fear of reprisal.
Article 13: Complaints Process 
13.1  The Association shall maintain a process to support Member companies 
in discharging their commitments under paragraphs 66, 67, and 68 of 
the Code, which require Companies to address claims alleging violations 
of the Code by establishing fair and accessible grievance procedures that 
offer effective remedies.
13.2  The Board shall develop procedures for this Article based on the following 
elements and submit them to the General Assembly for approval:
13.2.1  The Secretariat shall receive complaints from individuals or their repre-
sentatives, which must both (i) contain specific allegations of conduct that, 
if true, would constitute a violation of the Code, and (ii) allege harm to one 
or more of those individuals.  Complaints, including purely contractual or 
personnel disputes, that do not meet these criteria, or that are manifestly 
unfounded, frivolous or vexatious, will not be considered.
13.2.2  After a complaint has been received and considered under Article 13.2.1, 
the Secretariat shall inform the complainant, in a timely manner, of 
fair and accessible grievance procedures that may offer an effective 
remedy, including any such grievance procedure provided by a relevant 
Member company.  The Secretariat may facilitate access to such grievance 
procedures, but shall remain neutral and shall not act in a representative 
capacity.
13.2.3  If a complainant alleges that a grievance procedure provided by a relevant 
Member company is not fair, not accessible, does not or cannot offer an 
effective remedy, or otherwise does not comply with paragraph 67 of the 
Code, the Secretariat shall review that allegation.
13.2.4  After conducting such a review, the Secretariat may offer observations 
to the Member company, the complainant and the Board and engage in 
dialogue with the Member company and the complainant to address how, 
if at all, the grievance procedure provided by the Member company does 
not comply with paragraph 67 of the Code and on the possible need for 
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14.5  The Association shall not normally be responsible for the costs of Board 
Directors fulfilling their duties nor make payment for fulfilling duties as 
a Board Director.  
Article 15: Formation and Dissolution 
15.1  Private Security Service Providers who have signed the ICoC, together 
with civil society organizations and governments, have adopted these 
Articles of Association and have thereby created the ICoC Association, 
and have selected the first Board of Directors of the Association, on the 
occasion of its inaugural meeting, held in Geneva, Switzerland on 20 
September 2013.
15.2  The Association may be dissolved by the General Assembly upon a recom-
mendation by the Board or by resolution from among the membership 
of the General Assembly.   Dissolution shall require a vote of not less 
than two-thirds of the Members in each of the three stakeholder pillars 
who are present at the General Assembly and eligible to vote and may 
be decided only if such decision is included in the General Assembly’s 
agenda.   Dissolution is also de jure in the event of insolvency or if its 
bodies can no longer be constituted.     
15.3  In the event of liquidation of the Association, its remaining assets shall 
be entirely assignable to another public utility and tax exempt entity 
pursuing similar objectives to those of the Association.  In no cases shall 
the Association’s assets be returned to the Founders, Members or Board 
Members or be used for their profit in whole or in part and in whatever 
manner.
13.2.10  The existence of legal investigations or proceedings addressing the alleged 
conduct shall be considered, but will not of itself cause a suspension of 
the complaints process.  The Board may suspend or otherwise limit the 
complaints process as necessary and appropriate in order to avoid serious 
prejudice to any such investigations or proceedings or party thereto.
13.3  From time to time the Board shall publish guidance to Members on best 
practice and compliance with paragraphs 66, 67 and 68 of the Code, 
based on a review of complaints brought to the Association and claims 
brought to Member companies, and other relevant developments.
Article 14: Finances 
14.1  The Association shall derive its resources from membership dues; 
contributions provided by its membership; public and private donations, 
grants, fees and other payments; in-kind contributions and support; and 
its own assets.   The Association shall strive to achieve an appropriate 
balance of public and private funding.
14.2  The membership dues for companies shall be set as an annual fixed 
amount for small, medium and large Members. The three categories shall 
be based on each Member company’s revenue related to the provision of 
security services as defined in the Code.
14.3  The Association’s assets shall be used entirely and exclusively in 
furtherance of the Association’s public utility purposes as defined in 
Article 2 of the present Articles of Association.  Surplus revenues realized 
by the Association may in no case be distributed to Members of the 
Association.
14.4  The Board may suspend or terminate the membership of a company, or 
suspend processing of the certification application of a company, where 
such company is in arrears in its financial obligations to the Association 
and does not cure such arrears within sixty (60) days after notice from 
the Association.  A company that fails to cure financial arrears within the 
60-day period shall not be entitled to vote in a meeting of the General 
Assembly.
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Towards an International Code of Conduct for Private Security Providers: 
A View from Inside a Multistakeholder Process  
Anne-Marie Buzatu
The use of private security companies (PSCs) to provide security services has been on the 
rise since the end of the Cold War, with PSCs operating in a number of contexts, including 
armed conflict and areas where the rule of law has been compromised. The use of private 
actors to perform services that are traditionally associated with the state is not limited to 
PSCs, but is emblematic of a growing trend by governments to outsource functions with 
a view to improving efficiency and cutting budgets. Privatization of public functions can, 
however, present a number of challenges to existing national and international regulatory 
and oversight frameworks. In the private security sector these challenges were brought to 
international attention after high-profile incidents in which PSCs injured civilians revealed 
difficulties in effectively holding international PSCs accountable. This paper argues that 
crafting a multistakeholder regulatory approach in which key stakeholders work together to 
develop standards that are appropriately adapted for the private sector, as well as to create 
governance and oversight mechanisms to hold these private actors to effective account, helps 
to fill some of the governance gaps found in traditional regulatory approaches. It recounts 
the developments leading to the International Code of Conduct for Private Security Service 
Providers (ICOC) and its governance and oversight mechanism, the ICOC Association, 
offering an example of the development of an initiative which sets new international 
standards and elaborates a multistakeholder framework and approach to governance for the 
private security sector. A recent trend of state and non-state clients requiring compliance with 
the ICOC initiative in their contracts with PSCs offers a new take on binding international 
regulation of private actors.
Anne-Marie Buzatu is deputy head of the Public-Private Partnerships Division at the Geneva 
Centre for the Democratic Control of Armed Forces (DCAF). Working under a mandate of the 
Swiss government, she led DCAF’s work to support the elaboration of the International Code 
of Conduct for Private Security Service Providers from January 2009 to November 2010. She 
subsequently led the development of the ICOC Association, a multistakeholder governance 
and oversight mechanism for the ICOC, which began operations in September 2013. Current 
projects include working with the International Committee of the Red Cross to develop 
guidance related to security sector governance and reform for multinational companies, as 
well as supporting better governance approaches for internet/cyber security.
